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Game theory was used to analyze compensation systems
based on individual and group incentives. Payoff formulas
were developed for these incentives assuming different
preferences for individual and social outcomes. Two levels
of contributions were considered: 1) "defection" - the
minimum acceptable level of contributions, and
2) "cooperation" - a level of discretionary contributions
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above the minimum. The discretionary contributions
associated with cooperation were represented as a cost to
the individual.
A classification scheme for uniform n-person games was
developed using the approach of Rappaport and Guyer (1966)
for 2 X 2 games. This classification scheme defines the
natural outcome (cooperation or defection) for each game.
The analysis considered the Individual motive, based on
maximizing self-interest, and five social motives
(Collective, Competitive, Altruism, Equity and Aggression).
These motives reflect preferences for outcomes based on
payoffs to self and others. The results indicate the natural
outcome and game category for different values of the
individual and group incentive factors. satisficing theory
was also used to analyze the natural outcome for the
Individual motive.
Evolutionary game theory was used to develop two
simulation models for social motives. The models interpret
social motives as 1) genuine preferences for specific social
outcomes, or 2) indirect strategies for maximizing
individual payoffs. These models explore the interaction of
social motives and the resulting impact on the level of
cooperation.
The results were used to develop effectiveness criteria
for selecting inducement systems which should promote
cooperation. Additionally, cost curves were used to
determine the least cost inducement system. Based on these
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results, inducement systems using absolute incentives are
recommended over systems using competitive incentives.
Competitive incentives should only be considered when there
is limited need for coordination between individuals and
where aggressive andjor competitive behavior is acceptable.
The study has theoretical as well as practical
implications. Game theory provides a method for expanding
expectancy theory to include expectations about the actions
of others and provides a framework for integrating
expectancy theory and other theories based on social motives
(e.g. equity theory). The use of dynamic models from
evolutionary game theory breaks new ground in the theory of
motivation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study applies the methods of game theory to the
design of organizational inducement systems. The focus of
the study is on increasing our understanding of how
inducement systems motivate individual contributions in
support of organizational goals. organizational inducement
systems based on individual and group incentives are studied
using the methods of game theory. This study is comprised of
three phases of analysis. The three phases are depicted in
Figure 1, which shows an overview of the study.
In the first phase, game theory is used to analyze a
range of inducement systems to determine the values of
individual and group incentives needed to motivate
individuals to contribute their efforts towards the goals of
the organization. This analysis provides a conceptual
framework for studying motivation that moves beyond the
individual as the unit of analysis. The methods that are
developed allow expectations about the actions of others to
be used in analyzing an individual's decision to contribute
to the organization. This phase reflects the Individual
motive, which is based on a preference for maximizing
payoffs to self.
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Figure 1. Overview of the study.
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In the second phase, the payoffs for the inducement
systems being studied are reformulated to reflect
preferences for five alternative social motives:
1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism, 4) Equity, and
5) Aggression. The methods developed to analyze the
Individual motive are used in this phase to determine the
ability of inducement systems to motivate individuals with
varying social motives. This work provides a framework for
expanding expectancy theory to include preferences regarding
social outcomes as well as individual outcomes.
In the third phase, a method for studying the evolution
of social motives is presented. Two dynamic learning models
are developed using concepts from evolutionary game theory.
These simulation models provide a basis for determining how
social motives might evolve in response to the inducement
system being used by an organization. This method is also
used to examine the effects of the evolution of social
motives on the level of group cooperation.
Drawing from the results of these three phases of
analysis, criteria are identified for use in selecting
organizational inducement systems. These criteria can assist
practitioners in selecting inducements systems that should
be effective in promoting individual and group cooperation
with the goals of the organization. Inducement systems
meeting these effectiveness criteria are then reviewed based
on the costs of the inducement system to the organization.
on the basis of these evaluations, recommendations and
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guidelines are given regarding inducement systems which
should be effective and efficient in gaining the cooperation
of individuals with the goals of the organization.
Inducements
Business organizations, as social systems, are
characterized by the cooperation of individuals seeking to
achieve common economic goals. The coordination of the
actions of individuals to accomplish these goals is the
primary purpose of business organizations. Barnard (1938)
viewed business organizations as "cooperative systems" and
defined the organization as a "system of consciously
coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons".
For Barnard, the motivation for an individual to join an
organization is the access to the economic and social
rewards which result from coordinated activity.
Barnard (1938) and Simon (Simon, 1957; March and Simon,
1958) have been responsible for the development of the
concept of the inducements-contributions contract. They
characterize participation in an organization as involving
an unwritten contract between the organization and the
individual wherein the organization offers inducements to
the individual in exchange for the individual's
contributions to the goals of the organization. Only when
the value of these exchanges benefit both the organization
and the individual does there exist a stable basis for
organizational cooperation. For this to occur, individuals
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must place a higher value on the inducements they receive
than on their contributions. Similarly, the organization
must place a higher value on the contributions it receives
from the individual than it does on the inducements it
returns in exchange.
Because inducements are often based on the level of
contributions, individuals must choose their level of
contributions based on the inducements they hope to earn.
Organizations must select the level and types of inducements
they wish to offer for these contributions. These choices
will vary depending upon the nature of the organization and
the needs of individuals within the organization.
Inducements may be material or non-material (Barnard, 1938).
Material inducements include pay, benefits and physical
working conditions. Non-material inducements include
prestige, recognition, social interaction and satisfaction
of important personal values.
A multiplicity of inducements exists within
organizations. In business organizations, pay is the
principal material inducement. Because money spent in wages
or for other incentives is not available for other important
purposes (e.g. stockholders, taxes, reinvestment), it
represents a scarce resource. As a result, the management of
compensation programs is a critical function within most
business organizations. Paying too much in wages can lead to
bankruptcy. Paying too little can lead to a failure to
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retain individuals needed to perform the work of the
organization.
The business literature contains many examples of pay
systems designed to increase individual performance
(Lawler, 1981). In recent years (O'Dell, 1987), a great deal
of attention has been focused on compensation as a way of
increasing productivity and responding to growing
international competition. Pay systems can be considered to
be made up of three types of incentives: 1) base pay (e.g.
salary or hourly pay), 2) individual incentives (e.g. piece
rates, commissions and merit pay), and 3) group or system
incentives (e.g. profit sharing, gainsharing and bonus
plans).
The need to manage the payment of inducements leads to
the problem of how best to structure inducement systems to
make them more effective in gaining the cooperation of
individuals and more efficient in their use of
organizational resources. This study explores this
, question
.....

by using the methods of game theory to analyze different
classes of inducement systems.
Motivation
Pay systems are based on a variety of assumptions about
what motivates employees to put forth effort towards meeting
organizational goals. The literature on work motivation is
extensive (Pinder, 1984). While scores of theories of
motivation have been proposed, the majority of them find
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their origins in the assumption that individuals are driven
by self-interest to "seek pleasure and avoid pain"
(Vroom, 1964).
Since the time of Adam Smith (1776), "economic man" has
been one of the principal models used in understanding human
behavior. This model of human behavior has led to pay
systems that have generally been designed around the
assumption that individuals will choose a level of effort
that maximizes the value of inducements less contributions.
This approach is consistent with the majority of the
theories of motivation, particularly the various forms of
expectancy theory (Lawler & Suttle, 1973).
The literature on work motivation has been primarily
concerned with motivation as an individual (within-person)
process (Mitchell, 1982). With the exception of equity
theory (Adams, 1963), the major cognitive theories of
motivation fail to account for the effects of group
processes on individual motivation. Equity theory (Adams,
1964) proposes that individuals are motivated to seek
equality in the ratios of inducements to contributions
between themselves and relevant others.
The human relations school of organizational behavior
has pointed out that informal groups often exert powerful
influences on individual motives. This was illustrated in
the Hawthorne studies (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) and
the application of a piece rate to individuals working in
the Wiring Room. In this case, individuals chose to limit
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their output to levels below those which would have yielded
the highest net return. These restrictions in contributions
were based on group norms that defined the appropriate rate
of work for individuals in the Wiring Room. In that study,
the work group's actions reflected a belief that their
collective interests were served by setting productivity
norms, rather than allowing each individual to pursue a
level of productivity that maximized the individual's selfinterest. While the work on group processes has not resulted
in a formal theory of motivation, it does illustrate the
need for a more expansive theory of motivation - one capable
of considering social as well as individual motives.
The Wiring Room study illustrates a problem which is
common in social settings - the conflict between individual
and social motives. Hardin (1968) has pointed out how a
variety of social problems (e.g. overpopulation, pollution)
can be understood as conflicts between individual and
collective goals. Dawes (1980) has referred to these
conflicts as social dilemmas. These dilemmas are of special
interest to society, since the problem of balancing
individual and collective interests must be satisfactorily
resolved if social institutions are to be successful.
Game Theory
Game theory has been used to analyze a variety of
social dilemmas (Hamburger, 1978}. As developed by Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), game theory is a normative
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theory. It attempts to explain how individuals should
behave, rather than attempting to predict how they will
behave. Von Neumann and Morgenstern base their theory on
so-called "norms of rationality." These norms follow from
the assumption that people should behave so as to maximize
their self-interest. These "norms" or principles of
rationality are one of the key assumptions of game theory.
By hypothesizing that human behavior conforms to these
normative rules, researchers have been able to use game
theory for descriptive as well as normative purposes. Given
the widespread acceptance of the view that individuals
pursue their self-interests, game theory is a useful
starting point in analyzing organizational inducement
systems. At the same time, it is important that assumptions
about rationality be made explicit. Researchers have often
been guilty of failing to explicitly state their assumptions
regarding rationality.
In applying game theory to this study, payoffs to
individuals are based on the inducement system in use within
the organization. The inducement system specifies what
payoffs an individual receives for differing levels of
contributions. For simplicity, only two levels of
contributions are considered. Additional levels of
cooperation could be included in the analysis, but have been
excluded because they would unduly complicate the
presentation of theoretical concepts and results.
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Adopting the language commonly used in game theory, the
two levels of contributions are labeled "defection" and
"cooperation". Defection is defined as the minimum
acceptable level of contributions needed to maintain
membership in the organization. Cooperation is defined in
terms of a specified level of discretionary contributions
over the minimum. As used in this study, "cooperation" and
"defection" refer to an individual's level of contributions
towards the goals of the organization. Since other
definitions of cooperation and defection are commonly used
in discussing organizations (i.e. "cooperation" may mean
with other individuals, as opposed to the organization as a
higher level unit), care must be taken to distinguish those
usages frorn the context specific definitions used in this
study.
The payoffs for each level of contributions depend on
the difference between the value of contributions and the
value of inducements, as determined by the individual. since
inducements and contributions involve a number of differing
quantities, a common unit of comparison is needed. Game
theory typically expresses payoffs in terms of "utiles"
although other units of comparison (i.e. dollars) can be
used.
Inducements can include base pay and individual and
group incentives. These incentives may be positively or
negatively valued (i.e. rewards vs. punishments). As an
example, consider the following inducement system for a
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2-person organization. Each individual receives a base
salary of $3000/month, which they receive for the minimum
level of contributions. They also receive a group incentive
based on their collective contributions. If both individuals
contribute at the level defined as cooperation, then they
each receive a $600 group incentive for the month. If only
one individual cooperates, then they each receive $300.
Finally, assume that the extra effort associated with
cooperation has an equivalent cost of $800 to each player.
The payoffs for this inducement system are as follows:
DO

=

$3000 base pay + $0 group incentive - $0

contributions = $3000
Note: DO refers to the payoff to a defector when
the other person also defects. CD refers to the
payoff to a cooperator when the other person
defects.

cc = $3000 base pay + $600 group incentive - $800
contributions

=

$2800

DC = $3000 base pay + $300 group incentive - $0
contributions
CD

=

=

$3300

$3000 base pay + $300 group incentive - $800

contributions

=

$2500

The payoff matrix for this inducement system is shown
in Figure 2. For this set of payoffs, each individual
receives a higher payoff from defection than from
cooperation. This occurs regardless of the choice (defect or
cooperate) made by the other person. As such, defection is a
dominating strategy and would be classified by game theory
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as the rational choice. This outcome can occur in
organizations where group incentives are set at too low a
level to offset the added contributions required to earn
those incentives.
Player 2

c

D
2.8

c

2.8

3.3
2.5

Player 1
D

2.5
3.3

3.0
3.0

Note: Payoffs are in thousands of dollars.
Figure 2. Payoff matrix for 2-person inducement
system using group incentives.
The first phase of this study examines selected
combinations of base pay and individual and group incentives
to determine which inducement systems lead to cooperation as
a rational outcome. Using inducement systems similar to the
one shown above, varying levels of group and individual
incentives are analyzed to determine their ability to
promote cooperation.
As a part of this analysis, a classification scheme for
uniform n-person games was developed to specify the "natural
outcome" - the outcome most consistent with the principles
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of rationality used in game theory. This classification
scheme follows an approach used by Rappaport and Guyer
(1966) to develop a taxonomy of 2 X 2 games.
The majority of the work done in this study is based on
the analysis of 10-person groups. The 10-person case
provides insights into how group size influences the results
and illustrates the general n-person method of analysis. The
simpler 2-person case is used on occasion to present the
model in the easily understood format of the 2 X 2 game.
Where appropriate, generalized n-person formulas are
developed to present the major results of this phase of the
study.
Also included in phase I is a supplemental analysis
based on the satisficing theory of Simon (1976). Satisficing
theory hypothesizes that individuals who are receiving
"satisfactory outcomes" may continue with their existing
behavior rather than searching for a new and possibly better
alternative. As a result, an individual receiving a
satisfactory outcome from a given behavior (e.g. defection)
might continue that behavior even though game theory
indicates that another behavior (e.g. cooperation) would
lead to a superior outcome.
Returning to our earlier inducement system, suppose
that in addition to group incentives, the organization also
has individual rewards of $300 for cooperators. The revised
payoff matrix is now shown in Figure 3. For this set of
payoffs, defection is a dominating strategy. Each individual
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receives a higher payoff from defecting than from
cooperating, regardless of whether the other individual
cooperates or defects. Unlike the previous case, however,
the joint outcome that results when both individuals choose
to defect is inferior to the payoff each would receive from
joint cooperation, (i.e. DD<CC). In this example, both
individuals would be better off if they agreed to cooperate
rather than seeking to maximize their individual gains
through defection. This payoff matrix is an example of a
class of games known as "prisoner's dilemma" games. It is a
class of games that has been studied extensively (Rappaport
and Chammah, 1965) because of the conflict between
individual and collective rationality inherent in the game.
Player 2

c

D

3.1

c

3.3
2.8

3.1

Player 1
3.0

2.8

D

3.3

3.0

Note: Payoffs are in thousands of dollars.
Figure 3. Payoff matrix for 2-person inducement
system using individual rewards and group
incentives.
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Social Motives
Over 1000 papers have been published on the prisoner's
dilemma. Despite the normative recommendation to defect that
follows from a narrow technical analysis of this game, the
experimental literature presents a vastly more complex
picture of human motives and actions. Of particular interest
is the research on social motives. Several authors (Pruitt,
1967 & 1970; Messick & McClintock, 1968) have used the
prisoner's dilemma and other social dilemma games to
identify motives beyond individual maximization. Kuhlman and
Marshello (1975) have identified four motives: 1) self
maximization (individual), 2) joint maximization
(collective), 3) difference maximization (competitive), and
4) other's maximization (altruism). MacCrimmon and Messick
(1976) have proposed a framework for social motives that
contains three additional basic motives: 1) difference
minimization (equity), 2) other's minimization (aggression)
and 3) self minimization (self-sacrifice).
While only the first of the motives listed above is
based on the norms of rationality generally used in game
theory, they do reflect the strong societal norms evident in
everyday life. Because individuals often choose apparently
"irrational" strategies based on their social motives, it is
important that the designer of organizational inducement
systems know whether a given inducement system is able to
promote cooperation in a variegated environment of social
motives.
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The second phase of this study examines selected
inducement systems to judge their ability to promote
cooperation across a variety of social motives. This
analysis uses five of the six social motives identified
above. The motive of self-sacrifice is considered to be
unrealistic and has been dropped from the analysis. The
results of this portion of the study identify the levels of
group and individual incentives that should cause
individuals to cooperate for each of the social motives
being considered.
Behavioral Evolution
Game theory has also been used in theoretical biology
to study how behavioral patterns such as altruism and
reciprocity can evolve (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971; and
Maynard-Smith, 1982). Using the evolutionary concepts of
Darwin (1859), these studies have demonstrated how behaviors
can be genetically transmitted. More recently, these
concepts have been extended to cover the evolution of
learned behaviors (Dawkins, 1976). This approach can be used
to study the evolution of social motives in an
organizational context.
The third phase of this study reviews selected
inducement systems to determine how a population of
differing strategies might evolve, and to what extent the
level of cooperation would be affected. The method used to
study the evolution of strategies is based on the work of

17

Axelrod (1984), who used a computer simulation to model a
prisoner's dilemma game for a population of individuals with
differing strategies. The strategies were submitted by
theoreticians from around the world. In Axelrod's study, the
populations for each of the strategies were initially set
equal, and then adjusted after each round based on their
relative payoffs in the prior round. The simulation was
allowed to run until equilibrium populations for each of the
strategies were reached.
The approach used in this study is similar to the one
used by Axelrod. The frequencies of each of the social
motives are initially set equal, and the simulation is run
to determine how the frequencies evolved. Two simulation
models were used. One model treats motives as strategies for
acquiring material payoffs, while the other treats motives
as genuine preferences with their own inherent value.
Additionally, the overall level of cooperation was also
determined from the equilibrium populations.
Implications
The study concludes by discussing the practical
implications and theoretical significance of the methods and
the resu;ts. The three phases of analysis are used to
develop criteria for selecting inducement systems which
should be effective in promoting individual contributions
towards the goals of the organization. The most efficient
inducement systems meeting these criteria are identified
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based on the costs of the inducement system to the
organization. The results are discussed for each class of
inducements and recommendations given for applying the
results to the design of real-world inducement systems. The
limitations of the study are also presented and suggestions
given for additional empirical and analytical work.
The theoretical significance of the study is also
discussed. The relationship of this work to expectancy
theory and other theories of motivation is presented. The
use of game theory to expand the approach of expectancy
theory is highlighted. This expansion allows expectancy
theory to move beyond the individual as the unit of analysis
by including: 1} an analysis of the decisions of others, and
2) the consideration of social as well as individual
outcomes. Recommendations are given for future work to
develop an integrated theory of motivation capable of
incorporating a range of social motives.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This study is based on work being done in four distinct
areas: 1) motivation, 2) inducements 3) social motives, and
4) behavioral evolution. Ideas from research in these areas
have been brought together using methods from game theory
and theoretical biology to study how behaviors and social
motives are shaped by organizational inducement systems.
The business and industrial psychology literatures have
dealt extensively with the question of individual
motivation. A great deal has also been written about the
role of inducements in business organizations. These
literatures have tended to deal with motivation and
inducements using the individual as the unit of analysis.
A less well known area of work in social-psychology has
developed around the problem of social dilemmas - situations
where individual motives conflict with social motives. Game
theory has been applied to the study of social dilemmas to
determine the extent to which individual behavior is
influenced by social motives. Much of the literature on
motivation and social motives assumes that individual
preferences are fixed. Recent work in theoretical biology
has used game theory to show how learned behaviors can
evolve within a population. The methods of evolutionary game
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theory can be applied to the evolution of social motives
within an organizational setting.
Motivation
Motivating workers has become one of the dominant
issues in modern industrial society. Businesses, in
particular, have found that motivating workers is often
essential to their profitability and their ability to
survive in an increasingly competitive world economy. This
recognition has led to an extensive research literature on
the topic of motivation.
Needs Theories. Numerous approaches have been taken to
the study of motivation. Maslow (1943) and Alderfer (1969)
proposed theories of motivation based on human needs. Maslow
(1943) proposed that individuals are motivated by five basic
needs: 1) physiological needs, 2) safety needs, 3) love
needs, 4) esteem needs, and 5) self-actualization needs.
According to Maslow, these needs are arranged in a hierarchy
of prepotency, such that one level of needs is primary in
influencing the motivation of an individual at a given time.
Only when lower level needs are substantially satisfied will
the individual be motivated by the next level of needs.
Alderfer (1969) proposed a similar needs based theory
of motivation. Alderfer's ERG theory specifies three classes
of human needs: 1) existence, 2) relativeness, and
3) growth. Rather than proposing a simple hierarchy of
prepotency, Alderfer suggested that transferability,
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satisfaction-progression and frustration-regression are the
three mechanisms determining which class of needs will most
influence individual motivation.
Despite the popularity of Maslow's hierarchy, neither
of these needs-based theories has been supported through
research studies (Pinder, 1984). As a result, little current
work is being done in the area of needs-based motivation
(Mitchell, 1982).
Reinforcement Theories. Behaviorists, working largely
from animal studies, have proposed various reinforcement
theories to explain motivation. Skinner (1969) and others
believe that motivation could be described as learned
behavior resulting from an individual's history of rewards
and punishments. This research has focused on the use of
positive and negative reinforcement to alter the frequency
of a given behavior and the role of various reinforcement
schedules in creating learned behaviors. In general, these
theories are careful to avoid any assumptions about the
internal state or cognitions of individuals. Predictions are
based upon the observable history of reinforcements. A
substantial body of research in support of these theories
exists (Pinder 1984).
Cognitive Theories. The largest area of current
motivation research includes those theories characterized as
cognitive theories. The cognitive theories can be subdivided
into three main theories (Pinder, 1984): 1) equity theory,
2) goal-setting theory, and 3) expectancy theory.
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Adams (1963) proposed that individuals are motivated by
concerns over equity. Underpayment or overpayment can occur
relative to a standard or to a referent individual. When
underpayment or overpayment exists, individuals are
motivated to increase or decrease their effort to adjust for
the perceived inequity. Research on equity has generally
supported the predictions of the theory regarding
underpayment. .The theory has been less satisfactory in
predicting behavior involving overpayment (Pritchard, 1969).
Path-goal or goal-setting theories have been proposed
by Locke (1968) and Latham and Locke (1979) and can be
traced back to some of the original ideas of Fredrick Taylor
(Locke, 1982). These theories suggest that individuals are
motivated when they have specific, difficult-to-achieve
goals in combination with detailed supervisory feedback.
Commitment to these goals is enhanced through good
supervisory relations. Resistance to goals is overcome
through training, participation in goal-setting and rewards.
Field research on goal-setting has sometimes documented
dramatic increases in productivity, although goal-setting is
often difficult to manage in certain organizational settings
(Latham and Wexley, 1981).
The third and most significant of the cognitive
theories is expectancy theory. First proposed by Vroom
(1964), expectancy theory has been the most heavily
researched and accepted of the numerous theories of
motivation (Pinder, 1984). Vroom described his theory as
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being based on the hedonistic assumption that individuals
act so as to "maximize pleasure and minimize pain". Vroom's
theory defined motivation as a force acting on a person to
choose a particular action based on the interaction of
1) the person's expectancy that particular outcomes will
result from the act, and 2) the valence of these (firstlevel) outcomes. The valence of the first-level outcomes is
a function of the valences of all other second-level
outcomes and the instrumentality of the first-level outcome
in attaining these second-level outcomes.
Expectancy theory proposes that humans make choices
based on judgments about existing conditions and
expectations about the future. This contrasts with the
learning theories which rely solely on the history of
reinforcements in predicting behavior. In most regards,
however, there exist few differences between the
propositions of expectancy theory and those of the learning
theories (Pinder, 1984). This is not surprising, since
expectations regarding the future are influenced by what has
occurred in similar situations in the past.
Lawler (1971) and others have proposed various
alternative forms of expectancy theory. Lawler expressed the
motivational force as [E-->P][P-->O]V, where [E-->P] is the
expectancy or conditional probability that a given effort
will result in a given performance outcome and [P-->0] is
the expectancy that a given performance outcome will result
in outcomes with valence

v.

The valence of a set of outcomes
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is the positive or negative value of those outcomes to the
individual.
Various forms of expectancy theory were reviewed by
Lawler and Suttle (1973). Their review of prior research
showed moderate support for expectancy theory, with the best
correlations between effort and motivational force occurring
for the [E-->P][P-->O]V form of the theory. However, other
simpler forms of expectancy theory ([E-->P] and [P-->0]),
were nearly as good at predicting behavior. Valence did not
improve the predictability of the theory, although this may
have been a result of a lack of significant differences in
the valences of the outcomes associated with the
experiments.
The work of Lawler and Suttle (1973) is typical of work
in the field. While numerous forms of expectancy theory have
been confirmed in a variety of experimental settings, the
correlations between actual effort and predictions based on
expectancy measures have generally been modest (0.3 to 0.5).
The lack of strong empirical support for expectancy theory
has led researchers to question the methodologies used in
past research. In their review of methodological problems,
Campbell and Pritchard (1976) pointed out several problems
with past research on expectancy theory. These include:
1) lack of a clear specification of the dependent variable
(effort), 2) lack of test instruments with reliability and
construct validity, and 3) improper experimental design
(between-person versus within-person). In research where
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more attention has been given to correcting these
methodological problems, the results have generally been
more supportive of expectancy theory (Wanous, Keon and
Latack, 1983).
Deci (1971) has confronted expectancy theorists with
another more fundamental problem by proposing that the level
of motivation due to intrinsically motivating outcomes is
influenced by the use of extrinsic rewards. As an example,
an increase in the extrinsic rewards associated with a given
level of performance might lower the individual's intrinsic
motivation to perform at that level. If true, changes in the
motivational force could not be predicted from changes made
in extrinsic rewards, since levels of intrinsic motivation
would subsequently change. While not a direct refutation of
expectancy theory, Deci's propositions would limit the
application of expectancy theory in designing reward
systems, since the effects of changing the inducement system
could not be predicted. Support for Deci's propositions has
been mixed (Guzzo, 1979; Pritchard, Campbell and Campbell,
1977).
Pfeffer (1982) has criticized expectancy theory on the
grounds that it deals only with the individual as the unit
of analysis. Pfeffer argues that the limited success of
expectancy theory may be due to its inability to include the
effects of the social and environmental context on
individual behavior. Mitchell (1982) has also pointed out
that expectancy theorists view motivation as an "individual,

26

intentional" process, with no real attempt to understand how
group processes enter into the picture.
Summarizing the existing research on motivation, it is
clear that despite having a number of methodological
problems, expectancy theory is the most widely accepted
theory of motivation. While it has been gained acceptance by
many theorists and practitioners, the theory has a mixed
record in term of its predictive ability. More
fundamentally, however, expectancy theory has focused on the
individual as the unit of

analy~is.

While expectancy theory

is potentially capable of incorporating organizational
influences on individual expectancies, no clear framework
for doing this has emerged. One of the challenges facing
expectancy theorists is to incorporate their work into a
framework that reflects the influences of the organizational
environment on individual motivation.
Inducements
Barnard (1938) was one of the first authors to
formulate a theory of business organizations as "cooperative
systems." Barnard saw organizations as existing to
accomplish a common purpose. Individuals choose to cooperate
in seeking these common organizational goals based on the
satisfaction of personal motives. These personal motives may
be economic andjor social in nature.
Barnard was careful to distinguish the goals of the
organization from those of individuals within the
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organization. Individuals may be able to satisfy their

go~ls

independent of whether the organization reaches its goals.
Indeed, individual goals are often in conflict with
organizational goals (e.g. unionization).
Barnard saw one of the functions of the executive as
managing the "effectiveness and efficiency" of inducements.
Inducements are effective when they gain the required level
of individual contributions. Inducements are efficient when
they use a minimum of organizational resources. To gain the
level of contributions needed to achieve organizational
goals, individuals must receive sufficient inducements to
justify their contributions. The types of inducements
available within an organization may be either material or
nonmaterial and include pay, benefits, working conditions,
promotion, prestige, security, social interaction, feelings
of loyalty, sense of accomplishment and personal
recognition.
Based on Barnard's work, March and Simon (1958)
developed the idea of the inducements-contributions
contract. According to these authors, individuals make
contributions to the organization based on a perceived value
of inducements over contributions. The inducementscontributions contract involves questions of 1) membership
and 2) discretionary contributions. When the value of
inducements associated with membership outweigh the costs of
the contributions expected by the organization, there is a
basis for joining the organization. In exchange for joining
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the organization, the individual agrees to perform specified
tasks and to submit to the authority of the organization in
certain matters (e.g. conduct, hours of work, job
assignments). Individuals often choose from among various
employment opportunities based on which organization offers
the most favorable inducements-contributions contract.
Following the decision to participate in an
organization, an individual is faced with the choice of what
level of discretionary contributions to put forth beyond the
minimum required to maintain membership. Organizations often
make use of incentive systems to gain these discretionary
contributions. According to the Barnard-Simons theory, the
individual's decision regarding level of contributions is
also based on the comparison of the expected value of
inducements to the cost of contributions. This approach is
consistent with the approach used by the expectancy
theorists.
A variety of individual and group incentive systems
have been developed to promote individual contributions
(Lawler, 1983). Incentives can be either positive or
negative. The majority of these systems have relied
primarily on pay or other material inducements. Piece rates
are an example of one of the simplest forms of incentive
systems.
Individual incentive systems have been used extensively
in business organizations (Lawler, 1983; Bernardin and
Beatty, 1984). These systems generally involve a comparison
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of individual performance against established standards.
These standards can take such diverse forms as commissions,
piece rates, or performance objectives (O'Dell, 1987). Other
individual incentive systems appraise performance in
competitive terms, comparing one individual against others
in similar positions. Competitive incentives, such as sales
contests, are often in marketing and sales organizations
(Colletti, 1988).
Other incentive systems common in business
organizations are group bonuses, gainsharing and profit
sharing plans (Doyle, 1983). These incentive systems are
based on the performance of the organization or a selected
group of employees. These plans often base incentives on
meeting financial, production or cost-reduction goals.
Rewards are typically distributed on a system-wide basis
without regard to individual performance. Examples include
stock ownership, profit sharing and various gainsharing
plans (e.g. Rucker, Improshare, Scanlon).
While many different inducement systems have been used
by organizations, they each involve a combination of base
pay plus individual andjor group incentives. While pay and
benefits form the basis of the inducement systems found in
most modern businesses, other noncash incentives, such as
gifts, paid vacations, promotion or recognition awards are
also available. These incentives are generally less easy to
administer on a system-wide basis (Barnard, 1938).
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Not all inducements are under the control of the
organization. As illustrated by the Hawthorne studies
(Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939), groups can exert
powerful influences on individuals within an organization.
Hackman (1976) credits groups with a range of discretionary
stimuli which can be used to bring an individual's behavior
into line with group norms. Hackman sees group stimuli as
affecting behavior in two ways: 1) directly, when the group
rewards or punishes an individual, and 2) indirectly, when
the individual's informational or effective state is
modified.
Group norms often act to· influence decision making
rules for individuals within the group. As Hackman (1976)
has noted, conveying information to others in the group is
one of the main reasons for forming group norms. These norms
allow new entrants into the organization to quickly make
decisions based on the cumulative experience of the group.
In addition to contributing to the idea of the
inducements-contributions contract, Simon (1976) has also
pointed out that individuals often behave in ways
inconsistent with maximizing self-interest. In Simon's words
individuals do not "have the wits to maximize". Instead,
they adopt decision making strategies that lead to
satisfactory outcomes, rather than optimal outcomes. This
"satisficing" behavior leads individuals to choose heuristic
rules for making otherwise complex decisions. Tversky and
Kahneman (1984) have done extensive research on decision
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making heuristics and biases. other authors have shown how
various biases could have developed in real-world settings.
Social Motives
Individuals are often faced with situations where selfinterest conflicts with collective or group interests. When
this occurs, a social dilemma is said to exist (Dawes 1980).
In 1968, Hardin wrote his classic essay "The Tragedy of the
Commons", outlining how problems such as overpopulation and
pollution could be understood as social dilemmas (Hardin,
1968). Hardin's essay and the emerging societal concern over
social problems have led to a heightened interest in finding
solutions to these social dilemmas.
Prisoner's Dilemma. Game theorists have dealt
extensively with social dilemmas (Hamburger, 1978). The most
famous of these, the prisoner's dilemma, has been used to
model a number of social problems. The prisoner's dilemma
has been the subject of a tremendous amount of both
theoretical and experimental work (Rappaport and Chammah,
1965). In the simplest form of the prisoner's dilemma, two
individuals are envisioned to have a choice between
behaviors labeled as "cooperation" and "defection". A
typical payoff matrix is shown in Figure 4.
In this game, each player has a dominating strategy of
defection, such that regardless of the strategy chosen by
one player, the other player receives a higher payoff from
the choice to defect. The prisoner's dilemma has the
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Player 2

c

D
18

12

c
12

0

Player 1
0

6

D
18

6

Figure 4. Payoff matrix for a 2-person prisoner's
dilemma game.
property that when both players choose their dominant
strategy, they each receive a lesser payoff than they would
by mutually agreeing to cooperate. The prisoner's dilemma
has the paradoxical result that the individually rational
choice is collectively irrational.
Hundreds of experiments have been conducted to
determine whether individuals will choose to behave in
accordance with individual or collective rationality when
confronted by the prisoner's dilemma. In these experiments
game theory is being used for predictive purposes. The
results have been highly variable (Rappaport and Chammah,
1965). In some experiments, the results are consistent with
individual rationality, while in others collectively
rational behavior is observed. Attempts to explain why
individuals choose either defection or cooperation have
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looked at a number of factors, including group size, sex of
player, number of players, type of rewards, size of rewards
and initial instructions.
Pruitt (1968 and 1970) has published data showing that
individuals alter their level of cooperation depending upon
how the payoff matrix is presented to the group. Pruitt
decomposed the payoff matrix shown in Figure 4 into a series
of payoff tables that separate the payoffs under the
player's own control from those controlled by the actions of
the other player. Figure 5 shows three decompositions of one
prisoner's dilemma game.
own

other

own

other

own other

Figure 5. Three decompositions of a 2-person
prisoner's dilemma game.
Each of these three decompositions can be generated
from the payoff matrix shown in Figure 4. Pruitt observed
that when subjects were presented with the three
decompositions, differing levels of cooperation were
observed for each. Pruitt suggested that these differences
might be due to psychological reactions to the
decompositions into payoffs under one's own control and
those controlled by the other player.
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Social Motives. Messick and McClintock (1968) proposed
that individuals are motivated by social motives beyond
maximizing payoffs to self (Individual motive), such as
maximizing joint payoffs (Collective motive) or maximizing
relative differences between self and other's payoffs
(Competitive motive). They proposed that social motives
could be investigated by examining social dilemma games
where the values of various payoffs cause one or more
motives to be preferred. Based on these three social
motives, Messick and McClintock identified six classes of
games. The six classes differ in what social motives would
be satisfied by choosing alternative actions
(e.g. cooperation or defection). Games from these classes
were used to determine whether differences in the choices
made by individuals could be attributed to preferences for
certain social motives. Their empirical results support the
proposition that individuals are influenced by social as
well as individual motives.
McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman and Campos (1974)
continued this work on social motives and found that the
likelihood of an action being chosen increased as the number
of social motives satisfied by that action increased. These
authors considered the three motives presented in the
earlier work by Messick and McClintock (1968) plus the added
motive of aggression (i.e. minimizing payoffs to others).
The presence of social motives was confirmed in a study
by Liebrand and van Run (1985). These authors used two
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methods to determine the social motives of individuals from
groups of students in the United States and the Netherlands.
They considered four motives: 1) altruistic (maximize
other's payoffs), 2) cooperative (maximize joint payoffs),
3) individualistic (maximize own payoffs), and
4) competitive (maximize difference between own and other's
payoffs). After determining the dominant social motives of
individuals, the individuals were formed into groups (n=S)
to participate in a simulated social dilemma game that
allowed individuals to take resources from a common pool. In
the simulation, taking resources from the pool helped
individuals in the short run, but led to long-term resource
problems for the group. As expected, individuals with
competitive and individualistic motives took more resources
than individuals with cooperative motives. Individuals with
altruistic motives took the least amount of resources.
Maccrimmon and Messick (1976) proposed a framework for
social motives to aid in understanding social behaviors and
their impacts on social systems. They identify six basic
social motives: 1) self-interest, 2) self-sacrifice,
3) altruism, 4) aggression, 5) cooperation, and
6) competition. These six motives can be converted into
mathematical operators of summations and differences of
payoffs found in the matrix representation of a social
dilemma game. They go on to suggest that other more complex
motives, such as conditional motives based on score feedback
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or other external cues, may be useful in developing a better
understanding of social motives.
The work on social motives by the authors discussed
above has centered on using social dilemma games to verify
the presence of differing social motives in individuals. The
games used by these authors were selected for their ability
to force choices between various social motives. This
literature differs from the work done in this study in
several important ways. First, this study is based on a
specific topic area, organizational inducements. Second,
this study attempts to find games (inducement systems) which
promote a single behavior (cooperation) over as wide a range
of social motives as possible. Finally, the study expands
the work on social motives by considering how social motives
might evolve in response to a specific inducement system.
Evolution of Behavior
The conflict between individual and collective
rationality inherent in the prisoner's dilemma undermines
the belief that the greatest common good will be achieved
when individuals pursue their self-interest. As a result,
there have been a number of attempts to find a way to
overcome this paradox (Shubik, 1970: Rappaport, 1967). These
attempts often involve a restructuring of the game, such as
allowing for communications between the parties
(Schelling, 1963). Hardin (1968) took a more pessimistic
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view, concluding that the only stable solution lies in
"mutual coercion - mutually agreed upon".
The approaches listed above rely upon the addition of
features not originally included in game theory. Game
theorists have attempted to resolve the paradox in a
different manner by considering the game to be one with
multiple plays (iterative)

rat~er

than involving·only·a

single play (Shubik, 1970; Hamilton and Axelrod, 1981). This
approach allows for conditional strategies based on the
strategies used by other players in earlier rounds. The
attempt here is to resolve the paradox by finding a
conditional strategy where cooperation becomes both
individually and collectively rational.
Analyses of this type have shown that in cases where
the game is of an indeterminate number of plays and where
the probability of playing an additional round exceeds a
threshold value (based on the payoffs for cooperation and
defection), then strategies other than defection are
rational. The most famous of these strategies is
tit-for-tat.
Altruism and Kinship. The approach used to find a
rational basis for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
follows the approach used by theoretical biologists to
explain symbiotic and altruistic relationships in nature.
Hamilton (1964), Trivers (1971) and Maynard-Smith (1982)
have made extensive use of game theory in developing a
theory of behavioral evolution.
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Hamilton (1964) has used game theory to show how
altruistic behavior on behalf of an individual with a close
kinship relation could increase the altruist's Darwinian
fitness - the frequency of one's own genes in the gene pool.
Hamilton showed that even though the altruistic act may
reduce the altruist's chance of survival, it can increase
the likelihood that his genes are passed along through the
genes of the close kin who benefited from the altruistic
behavior.
The strength of Hamilton's theory has been demonstrated
by its ability to provide an explanation for the evolution
of social insects. With the exception of termites, all
social insects from the order Hymenoptera share the common
reproductive trait that females are diploid (two sets of
chromosomes) and males are haploid (one set of chromosomes).
Because of this trait, females are more closely related to
their sisters than to their daughters. As a result, females
can best pass on their genetic material by helping in the
rearing of sisters rather than by raising their own
daughters. Using these kinship relations, Hamilton was
successful in providing an explanation for the reproductive
division of labor in social insects.
Trivers (1971) extended this approach to include
reciprocal altruism not based on kinship relations.
Reciprocal altruism can occur between individuals of the
same species or between individuals from different species.
Trivers showed that where individuals come into contact
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frequently enough to allow for multiple opportunities to
reciprocate altruistic acts on behalf of one another, then
altruism would increase an individual's Darwinian fitness.
Trivers has used this approach to explain cleaning
symbioses in certain species of fish and warning calls in
birds. Trivers has also proposed an explanation of
reciprocal altruism in humans. He includes the following
types of behavior as examples of reciprocal altruism:
1) helping in times of danger; 2) sharing food: 3) helping
the sick, wounded, or very old or very young: 4) sharing
implements, and 5) sharing knowledge. Trivers finds that
altruistic behavior generally involves a small cost to the
giver when compared to the benefit to the beneficiary.
Altruistic behavior becomes advantageous when there is a
sufficient probability that the act will be reciprocated in
the future.
Trivers goes on to suggest that individuals have a
tendency towards both altruism and cheating (i.e. not
reciprocating altruism in the future). Individuals can
increase reproductive success if they find ways to cheat
while others engage in reciprocal altruism. Trivers proposes
that individuals have evolved complex psychological systems
to uncover and punish cheaters and to identify and reward
altruists. Elements of the psychological system could
include friendship, guilt, reparative altruism, moralistic
aggression, gratitude and sympathy.
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Maynard-Smith (1978) has made extensive use of game
theory to explain the evolution of behavior in a wide range
of species (slime mold to humans). He has developed and made
extensive use of the concept of an evolutionarily stable
strategy. Simply stated, an evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS) is a strategy with the property that when it is
adopted by an entire population, it can resist invasion by
any other mutant strategy. The concept of the ESS is linked
to the biologist notion of Darwinian fitness. Using the
concept of the ESS, biologists can make use of principles
from evolution to describe genetically-based behaviors.
The approach of the theoretical biologists to the
evolution of cooperative and altruistic behaviors has
typically taken a "gene's eye" view. Social behaviors are
attributed to a genetically determined predisposition for
the behavior. In most cases, a genetic basis for behavior is
assumed without any identification of the actual genes or
mechanisms involved. More recent work has drawn a
distinction between genetically-based behaviors and those
based on learning or culture. Much of the controversy
surrounding sociobiology hinges on the question of genetic
versus cultural factors in the development of human
behaviors (Barlow and Silverberg, 1980).
Learned Behaviors. Dawkins (1976) breaks with most
biologists by treating cultural evolution as a separate
phenomena from genetic evolution. Dawkins coins the term
"memes" to refer to artifacts in the cultural world that are
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similar to genes in their ability to grow in use through
replication, fecundity and copying fidelity. While Dawkins
sees cultural and genetic evolution in analogous terms, he
does not attempt to provide a genetic basis for cultural
evolution. In a similar vein, Boulding (1982) distinguishes
between the

sl~w

process of genetic evolution and the rapid

evolution of culture over the past few thousand years.
In recent years, some theoretical biologists have
extended evolutionary game theory to cover learning
processes. These learning processes influence how culturally
based behaviors are adopted and modified. Harley (1981) and
Maynard-Smith (1984) postulate that individuals have rules
for learning new behaviors. These learning rules are thought
to be influenced by genetic factors such that natural
selection would lead to an evolutionarily stable learning
rule. An evolutionarily stable learning rule is a rule for
learning the ESS in a single generation. Harley showed that
a learning rule (relative payoff sum) that based its
selection of strategies on the payoffs from earlier trials
would be an evolutionarily stable learning rule. The
relative payoff sum learning rule chooses the strategy it
will use at each trial based on the relative payoff sums of
each strategy. It is a stochastic rule in that individuals
continue to play all strategies with a frequency based on
their cumulative payoffs from each strategy. Prior payoffs
are discounted using a memory retention factor.
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Dawkins (1980) suggests that the concept of the ESS can
be extended cover learned behaviors. He labels such a
strategy as a Developmentally stable Strategy (DSS). A DSS
is a learned behavior that can resist being replaced by
another behavior based on its increased fitness to the
individual during his lifetime.
Axelrod (1984) used a similar approach to investigate
the evolution of cooperation in an iterated prisoner's
dilemma game. Axelrod solicited strategies from game
theorists, economists and others. These strategies were
entered into a computer based tournament where each strategy
initially has equal numbers (population) of individuals
playing that strategy. Individuals were allowed to interact
with each other on a random basis. Each individual was able
to recognize each of the other players and had a complete
history of all prior encounters with each player. At the end
of each round of the tournament, the population of each
strategy was adjusted based upon the relative payoffs during
that round. The simulation was ran until the proportion of
the population represented by each strategy reached an
equilibrium.
Using the computer simulation, Axelrod was able to
demonstrate the robustness of tit-for-tat (and some other
strategies) when confronted by a wide range of competing
strategies. While Axelrod's computer simulation does not
indicate which strategies are evolutionarily stable, the
simulation does show what proportion of the final population
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each strategy would represent. These equilibrium populations
are important in understanding the overall behavior (i.e.
cooperation or defection) of the population.

CHAPTER III
METHODS

Game Theory
The methods used in this study are based on the
mathematical theory of strategic games developed by Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Better known as game theory,
this branch of mathematics deals with decision making
situations involving multiple players, where the outcomes
from each player's choice are influenced by the choices made
by other players. Game theory has been widely applied in
economics and other disciplines where agents must make
choices involving payoffs which depend on the choices of
others as well as their own.
The word "game" carries many connotations - football,
chess, tic-tac-toe, etc. The games dealt with by game theory
are formal games. They are models of situations, such as the
nuclear arms race, which may seem to have little in common
with the games mentioned above. The games dealt with by game
theory have five basic elements: 1) players, 2) choices,
3) outcomes, 4) preferences, and 5) strategies. These
elements define a game within the mathematical framework
required by game theory. Luce and Raiffa (1957) provide a
good introduction to the general approach and methods of
game theory.
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Players. To be a game, the situation being modeled must
have multiple players. Players are usually viewed as
cognitive actors, such as individuals, groups or nations.
However, game theory can also consider non-cognitive
entities, such as lower organisms or nature treated as an
agent. In this study, individuals who are employees of a
business organization will be of primary interest.
Much of game theory deals with games involving two
players, so-called 2-person games. These games are useful
because they are less complex than games involving multiple
players where the number of choice combinations which must
be considered quickly becomes unmanageable. These 2-person
games are also useful because they can be represented by
2-dimensional payoff matrices showing the outcomes of each
combination of choices made by the two players. This study
uses 2-person games to develop a model of organizational
inducements in a easily understood and manageable framework.
A 10-person model is used to present the majority of
the results from this study. The 10-person model is used for
two reasons: 1) to show how a larger group size influences
the results, and 2) to illustrate the method of analysis
which can be used in the general n-person case.
Additionally, several of the important results from the
study are generalized to the n-person case.
Choices. The second element of a game is the presence
of choices. Each choice represents an alternative course of
action on the part of a player. These choices are usually

~--
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thought of as being made based on principles of rationality.
However, it is often useful to consider choices made on
other bases.
This study examines the choices an individual makes
about the level of contributions he will make towards the
goals of the organization. Two levels of contributions are
considered. The first level represents the minimum level of
contributions which an individual must make in order to
maintain membership in the organization. In a business
organization, this is the minimum level of contributions
expected of an employee. Failure to provide this level of
contribution would be reason for termination. Using a common
label from game theory, this level of contributions is
referred to as "defection". The defection involves the
withholding of discretionary contributions above the
minimum.
The second level of contributions being considered
represents a specified level of contributions over the
minimum. This higher level of contributions might take the
form of a fixed number of sales, performance against
established standards, or meeting a budget target.

It might

be easily achieved or might require major effort on the part
of the individual. This level of discretionary contributions
is referred to as "cooperation".
In this study the labels of "defection" and
"cooperation" are used to describe choices in terms of their
support for the goals of the organization. Cooperation with
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the goals of the organization is different than cooperation
with other individuals within the organization. In some
cases it may be that cooperation between individuals would
lead to defection from the goals of the organization. Union
strikes are an example of cooperation between individuals
which results in defection from the goals of the
organization.
These two levels of contributions are useful to
consider because they can be used as the basis for providing
individual rewards andjor punishments to players. Many
modern compensation practices are based on paying
individuals based on their level of contributions to the
organization. Obviously, individuals in real organizations
are faced with an almost infinite number of choices
regarding their level of

con~ributions.

This study considers

only two choices in the level of contributions. While other
intermediate levels could be considered, the added
complexity would detract from the presentation of key ideas
and results. Nothing in the method, however, requires that
only two level of contributions be considered. While
somewhat more cumbersome, this method can be extended to
multiple levels of cooperation.
Outcomes. The third element of a game is the set of
outcomes that occur for each player as a result of his
choice and the choices made by the other players. The
outcomes or payoffs can take many forms, such as
termination, money, effort expended, or promotion. In this
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study, the outcomes are considered to result from the choice
by players to defect or cooperate.

Outcomes may include a

negative component and a positive component. These two
components are: 1) the added effort required to achieve the
level of contributions labeled as cooperation (negative),
and 2) the payoffs that the individual receives from the
organization based on his or her level of contributions
(positive). These payoffs (inducements) are assumed to take
the form of extrinsic payments and are represented in terms
of a utility scale. Organizations typically make use of a
wide variety of extrinsic inducements. In addition to pay
and benefits, organizations use recognition, noncash awards,
perquisites and employee discipline. The relation between an
individual's payoffs and his contributions is assumed to be
defined by the organization's inducement system.
Preferences. The fourth element of a game is the set of
preferences for each of the players. Players will value
certain outcomes over others. In game theory, outcomes are
usually converted to an interval scale, where the least
valued outcome has zero utility (measured in

11

utiles") and

the highest valued outcome has utility of one utile.
The outcomes from cooperation includes not only the
inducements which the player receives from the organization,
but also the effort associated with the higher level of
contributions defined as cooperation. This added effort must
be treated as a disutility or cost to the player.
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Lotteries are typically used to determine the utility
of a range of outcomes (Rubinstein, 1975). In this study, a
common utility scale is assumed for both inducements and
contributions. This allows the utility of inducements to be
compared with the disutility of effort. The disutility of
the effort required to contribute at the level defined as
cooperation is assigned a value of minus one (-1.0) utiles.
The utilities of various inducements are then established in
terms of this interval scale. This allows for the utilities
of inducements and contributions to be combined into a
single payoff function. In testing the results of this
study, researchers will need to use a common measurement
scale for determining the utilities of contributions and
inducements. care will also need to be taken to avoid
scaling problems (i.e. insignificant rewards, nonlinear
utility functions, etc.).
This study treats each of the individuals in a given
game as having identical preferences and choices. This
assumption allows for considerable simplification of the
analysis by converting the game to a uniform n-person game.
In real organizations, individuals vary in their skills and
the effort needed to accomplish differing tasks. The values
they place on their contributions and the inducements they
receive also vary.
This assumption is not as limiting as it may seem.
Motivation is an individual process operating within the
person (Mitchell, 1982). The model of motivation developed
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in this study allows individuals to make choices based on
their expectations of how others will behave. The model
assumes that the individual's expectations about what is
rational for others are consistent with what he considers to
be rational for himself. While individuals within a group
may have differing preferences, an individual may well make
choices based on the belief that others have similar
preferences. This "like me" bias is one that is often
encountered in the real world. It is a useful heuristic bias
when other information is not available. However, where
individuals have detailed knowledge about the preferences of
others, a more expansive analysis would be needed. The
complexities involved in including multiple players with
different motives goes beyond the scope of this study.
strategies. The final element of a game is its set of
strategies. Individuals often make their choices based on a
specified strategy. A strategy is a decision rule for
choosing between alternative actions. Individuals need not
be conscious of their strategies. Strategies can be habitual
patterns of behavior based on genetic factors. They may also
change in response to reinforcement or learning.
Strategies may be pure (e.g. always defect) or mixed
(e.g. defect 60% and cooperate 40%). They may also be
conditional strategies, such as defect if the majority
cooperated on their last play. The social motives being
considered will generally result in a pure strategy for a
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given inducement system. In some cases, however, mixed
strategies must also be considered.
Inducement System Model
To apply game theory to the study of inducements, it is
first necessary to build a model of the inducement systems
being studied. The inducement system specifies the positive
and negative inducements that individuals receive in
exchange for their contributions to the organization.
Inducements can be broken down into three components:
1) base pay, 2) individual incentives, and 3) group
incentives. In developing this model of inducement systems,
a number of symbols will be used. Table I shows a list of
symbols used in this study.
Base pay is that portion of an individual's
compensation which is independent of both the individual's
level of contributions and the contributions made by others
in the organization. Base pay is of limited interest in this
study because it is not linked to the individual's choices
about his level of contributions or to the choices of
others. Base pay becomes important when the individuals
assess whether their total compensation is satisfactory. For
the purposes of this study, it will be assumed that total
compensation is perceived as satisfactory when it is set at
the market rate for the position. In the real world,
individuals might expect to be compensated above market if
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TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS

Symbol

Definition

c

# of cooperators

d

# of defectors

n

group size (n=c+d)

r

reward factor

p

penalty factor

g

group incentive factor

C(c)

payoff function for cooperation

D(c)

payoff function for defection

i or j

subscript for social motives

k

# of rounds in simulation model

f(i,k)

frequency of motive i in round k

EPC(i,k)

expected payoff for cooperation for
motive i in round k

EPD(i,k)

expected payoff for defection for
motive i in round k

b(i,k)

behavior of motive i in round k

PC(i,k)

actual payoff for cooperation for
motive i in round k

PD(i,k)

actual payoff for defection for
motive i in round k
maximum possible payoff for
motive i
minimum possible payoff for
motive i

P(i,k)

relative payoff for motive i in
round k

53

the firm is notably successful. Conversely, individuals
from a failing company might expect less compensation.
The second component of inducements is individual
incentives. These incentives can be either positive
(rewards) or negative (penalties). Many modern compensation
systems for nonunion employees make use of some form of
individual incentives for employees (O'Dell, 1987). Lawler
(1983) and others have proposed that an individual's pay be
based on his level of performance (i.e. contributions).
Lawler has been active in recommending "pay for performance"
as the basis of inducement systems for business. A recent
survey (O'Dell, 1987) showed that 28% of Arnerican firms use
some form of individual incentives. Under many individual
incentive plans, the incentive is linked to a specified
level of contributions. Piece rates and sales commissions
are examples of this type of incentive.
In this study, the term "absolute 11 is used to refer to
individual incentive systems that tie rewards and/or
penalties to a specified level of contributions. Absolute
rewards are positive incentives given to individuals who
contribute at the level defined as cooperation. The size of
the reward is determined by the reward factor (r) which
gives the value of the reward relative to the cost of the
added effort associated with cooperation. Absolute penalties
are negative incentives assessed against individuals who
contribute at the level of contributions defined as
defection. The size of the penalty is determined by the
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penalty factor (p), which gives the value of the penalty
relative to the cost of the added effort associated with
cooperation.
A second form of individual incentives are those that
are based on the individual's performance relative to others
in the organization. Unlike absolute incentives, the payoffs
from competitive incentives depends on the level of
contributions of others. As an example, sales organizations
sometimes pay bonuses to individual sales representatives
who sell more than their peers. The term "competitive" is
used in this study to refer to incentive systems that link
individual rewards and penalties to the relative
contributions of other individuals. While intraorganizational competition is common, it is not generally a
formal part of the inducement system (except in sales
organizations). Individuals compete for recognition, job
assignments, promotions and other perquisites. Even in
organizations where absolute incentives are used, the
expected level of contributions is influenced by
competition. Where competitive incentives are a formal part
of the inducement system, they often take the form of
special cash and noncash incentives or recognition rewards.
Sales organizations sometimes use sales contests to
create internal competition between sales representatives.
These contests can be based on achieving quotas, competing
against others, team competition or improving on past
performance. A recent report on sales incentives (Colletti,
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1988) indicated that while quotas were the most popular
basis of competition, the second most common basis was
competing against others. The report notes that this
preference for quotas (versus competing against others) may
be due to the increasing need for cooperation between sales
representatives across product lines.
competitive rewards can be formulated in a number of
different ways. Because they are infrequently used and often
only included as an informal part of the inducement system
or as special incentive/recognition programs, there is
little in the literature on the design of competitive
incentives. In many cases, managerial discretion plays a
major role in how competitive incentives are distributed with regard to both size and frequency. O'Dell (1987)
indicates that the majority of recognition awards typically
go to only 5% of the population.
The payoff formulas developed for this study base the
size of competitive rewards and penalties on the difference
between the discretionary contributions of the individual
and the average level of discretionary contributions by the
group. When only a few cooperate the reward is large, while
when many cooperate the reward is small. Conversely, when
only a few defect the penalty is large, while when many
defect the penalty is small. The reward to each cooperator
is defined as r(1-(cjn)) and the penalty to each defector is
defined as p(O-(c/n)) or -p(c/n); where:
r = reward factor
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p = penalty factor
c = # of cooperators
d = # of defectors
n = # of individuals in group (n=c+d)
While other formulations are possible, this formulation
has the common sense feature that the size of the reward
(or penalty) increases as the difference between the level
of contributions by the individual and the level of
contributions by the group increases. Additionally, these
formulas are easily analyzed because of their simple form
and because they yield payoff functions that vary linearly
with the number of cooperators.
The third component of inducements is group incentives.
These are incentives that are paid to each individual based
on the overall performance of the group or organization.
Unlike individual incentives, each individual receives the
group incentive regardless of his contributions to the
group's performance. A number of group incentives have been
used in business organizations - profit sharing, Scanlon
Plan, Rucker Plan, Improshare and others. While the
administrative details of these plans differ, they each make
incentive payments based on the overall performance of the
group.
In this study, the aggregate level of contributions
(number of cooperators) is used as a surrogate for group
performance. The size of the group incentive increases with
the number of cooperators and the size of the group
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incentive factor (g). Each individual in the group receives
a group incentive equal to g(c/n), where:
g = group incentive factor
c

=#

of cooperators

n = # of individual in group
Like the reward and penalty factors, the group
incentive factor is given relative to the cost of the added
effort associated with individual cooperation. When g equals
one (g=l.O) and each individual in the group cooperates
(c=n), the group incentive payment to each individual just
offsets the cost of contributing the added effort.
Inducement systems make use of base pay, individual
incentives and group incentives in differing combinations.
Ignoring base pay for the moment, we can identify two types
of inducement systems 1) inducement systems based on
absolute individual incentives and 2) inducement systems
based on competitive individual incentives. These two types
of inducement systems may or may not include group
incentives. Within each of these types of inducement
systems, we can classify inducement systems based on whether
they make use of rewards, penalties or both. This results in
six classes of inducement systems as shown is Table II.
Included in Table II are the formulas for the payoffs
to cooperators and defectors for each of the six classes of
inducement systems. Group incentives are included in the
formulas, but can be removed by setting the group incentive
factor (g) equal to zero. An infinite number of inducement
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TABLE II
CLASSES OF INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS
Formula

Classes
Absolute
Rewards
Penalties
Both
Competitive
Rewards
Penalties
Both

C(c)
D(c)
C(c)
D(c)
C(c)
D(c)

=
=
=
=
=
=

g(c/n)+r
g(c/n)
g(c/n)
g(c/n)-p
g(c/n)+r
g(c/n)-p

C(c)
D(c)
C(c)
D(c)
C(c)
D(c)

=
=
=
=
=
=

g(c/n)+r(l-c/n)
g(c/n)
g(c/n)
g(c/n)-p(c/n)
g(c/n)+r(l-c/n)
g(c/n)-p(c/n)

C(c) = Payoff Function for Cooperators
D(c) = Payoff Function for Defectors
Note: The above formulas show inducements only and
the total payoffs for cooperators must be
decreased to reflect the cost of contributions.
systems can be defined for each of the six general types by
varying the values of r,p and g. These six classes of
inducement systems have two main variables, 1) individual
incentives (rand/or p), and 2) group incentives (g). These
two variables will form the axes for mapping the analytical
results of each class of inducement systems.
Figure 6 shows the payoff functions for an inducement
system using absolute rewards (r=1.2) and group incentives
(g=l.l) and a group size of ten (n=lO). Figure 7 shows the
same data, but in the format normally used in game theory.
In Figure 7, the two lines have been shifted to illustrate
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Figure 6. Payoffs for absolute rewards
(r=l.2, g=l.l).
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Figure 7. Payoffs for absolute rewards using game
theory format (r=1.2, g=1.1).
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the payoffs one would receive from changing strategies. To
show how Figure 7 is used, suppose that a player is one of c
cooperators. This player can continue to cooperate or choose
to become a defector. Changing from cooperation to defection
increases the number of defectors from d to d+1. The
question in the player's mind is, therefore, whether he
would receive a better payoff as one of d+1 defectors or as
one of c cooperators. The format used in Figure 7 allows for
a quick comparison between these two payoffs. By making this
comparison for each possible outcome (i.e. c=1 to c=n), this
format can be used to see if one strategy dominates the
other. If the two payoff curves do not cross, then the upper
curve is a dominating strategy.
Social Motive Formulation
The model of inducement systems developed above
specifies the players, choices and outcomes based on the
class of inducement system and the values of the incentive
parameters r, p and g. Because the outcomes have been
converted to a utility scale, preferences could normally be
ignored assuming that individuals would prefer their maximum
outcome. In this study, however, we consider the possibility
that individuals will make choices reflecting social motives
which go beyond self-maximization.
Two interpretations of social motives occur in the
literature. The first, from the social-psychology literature
(Messick and McClintock, 1968), considers these motives to
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reflect genuine preferences for various social outcomes.
Viewed in this way, outcomes which satisfy the social
motive(s) of the individual are preferred. The second
interpretation of social motives comes from the literature
on evolutionary game theory (Trivers, 1964). Social motives
are treated as strategies for optimizing outcomes (i.e. as
strategies whose "real" purpose is still self-maximization).
These strategies have varying success in gaining outcomes
that increase the fitness of the individual. In this study,
both of these interpretations are considered.
Six social motives are considered in this study
1) Individual, 2) Collective, 3) Competitive, 4) Altruism,
5) Equity, and 6) Aggression. These motives are taken from
the social-psychology literature (Maccrimmon and Messick
1976). Figure 8 depicts these motives in terms of the
relationship between payoffs to self and payoffs to others.
To apply game theoretic methods to these motives, it is
necessary to reformulate the payoffs for these motives in
terms of the payoffs which resulted from the model of
inducement systems developed earlier.
The Individual motive is based on a preference for
maximizing the payoff to self. The Individual motive is
typically the only motive considered by game theory. This
motive is sometimes referred to as "self-maximization". This
motive serves as the basis for most models of "economic man"
and is consistent with the approach of expectancy theory.
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Figure 8. Graphical representation of social motives.
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The payoff formulas developed in the previous section
(see Table II) for the six classes of inducement systems are
given in terms of their utility to the individual. As such,
they are also the correct formulas for the Individual
motive. These payoffs for the Individual motive can also be
used as the basis for defining the payoffs for the other
social motives. Table III gives the relationship between the
payoffs from the Individual motive and the other social
motives. These formulations are equivalent to those used by
MacCrimmon and Messick (1976).
TABLE III
MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL MOTIVES
Social Motive

Formula

Individual

Cindiv.
0 Indiv.

Collective

Ccoll.
Dcoll.

Competitive

Ccomp. = c-((c-1)C+dD)/(n-1)
Dcomp. = D-(cC+(d-1)D)/(n-1)

Altruism

CAltru. = ((c-1)C+dD)/(n-1)
DAltru. = (cC+(d-1)D)/(n-1)

Equity

CEquity = -ABS(C-((c-1)C+dD))/(n-1)
DEquity = -ABS(D-(cC+(d-1)0))/(n-1)

Aggression

CAggr. = -((c-1)C+dD)/(n-1)
DAggr. = -(cC+(d-1)D)/(n-1)

=
=

C
D

= (cC+dD)/n
= (cC+dD)/n

Note: The argument has been dropped from the
payoff functions for cooperation (C(c)=C) and
defection (D(c)=D).
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The preference reflected in the Collective motive is
the maximization of the overall outcome for the group. This
is accomplished by maximizing the joint (or collective)
payoffs to the individuals in the group.
The Competitive motive reflects a preference for doing
better than others in the group. The size of the monetary
payoff is unimportant, so long as one does better than
others. This motive can be characterized as maximizing-the
difference between the individual's payoff and the average
payoff to other players.
The Altruism motive is based on the preference of
increasing the welfare of others. This motive attempts to
maximize the payoffs to others, while disregarding payoffs
to self. While similar to the Collective motive, there are
important differences between these two motives. In
particular, the altruist will sacrifice his own interests if
it benefits others. This self-sacrificial behavior becomes
important when considering group incentives and competitive
rewards and penalties.
The preference reflected in the Eguity motive is
equality of payoffs. The payoffs for this motive are based
on minimizing the difference between the payoff to the
individual and the average payoff to others. Both
underpayment and overpayment are of concern in this motive.
As a result, the mathematical representation of the Equity
motive is based on the absolute value of the difference
between payoffs to self and payoffs to others. Because game
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theory usually deals with maximization (vs. minimization),
the payoff formula shown in Table III includes a minus sign
to convert the formula to an equation to be maximized. The
Equity and Competitive motives are closely related, CEquity
is equal to -ABS(Ccomp.> and DEquity is equal to
-ABS(Dcomp.).
The Aggression motive is based on the preference to
have others achieve their worst outcome. As such, it is the
opposite of the Altruism motive. It is represented by
minimizing the average payoff to others. The minus sign
included in the formula shown in Table III is used to
convert the payoffs to an equation to be maximized. Except
for this minus sign, the payoff functions for the Altruism
and Aggression motives are identical.
Analysis
With the players, choices, outcomes and preferences
defined, it is possible to apply the methods of game theory
to the problem of strategic choice. Game theory makes its
recommendations about what choices a player should make
based on assumptions about how a rational individual would
behave. These assumptions are often referred to as
principles of rationality (Rubinstein, 1975).
The first of these assumptions is that the other
players are rational and that they make their choices based
on the same principles of rationality. The second principle
is the maximin criterion. This criterion states that each
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player should make a choice that guarantees the player his
maximin payoff. The maximin payoff is the maximum of the
minimum payoffs a player can secure through his own action.
Consider the payoff matrix shown in Figure 9. This payoff
matrix shows the payoffs to player 1 only. Player 1 can
choose action A or action B. By choosing action B, player 1
can guarantee a payoff of 4 utiles. In contrast, choosing
action A only secures a payoff of 2 utiles. Choosing B
guarantees the maximum of the minimum possible payoffs. This
is the maximin choice.
Player 2
A
B
A

2

9

B

6

4

Player 1

Figure 9. Example of maximin strategy for a 2person game.
The maximin criterion is one of the central assumptions
of game theory. Other decision making criteria might be used
in studying inducement systems (e.g. maximax, minimax,
Laplace, minimum regret, etc.). These alternative decision
making criteria are described by Rubinstein (1975). Because
this study follows the approach of game theory, the maximin
criterion is of primary importance. These other criterion,
while of interest, are beyond the scope of this study.
Using the maximin criterion it is possible to find the
equilibrium solution for zero-sum games. In a zero-sum game,
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the size of the total payoff is fixed, so that gains by one
player come at the expense of other players. The games this
study deals with are nonzero-sum games. Indeed, it is the
possibility that individuals will share in the value created
through their coordinated actions that causes individuals to
join business organizations. For nonzero-sum games, some
added principles are needed to find the maximin solution.
To understand the additional principles of rationality used
in this study, it is first necessary to define several
concepts from game theory (see Raiffa and Luce, 1957).
The first of these concepts is that of dominance. One
strategy dominates another strategy if and only if the
payoffs for using that strategy are no worse and in at least
one case better than the payoffs for the other strategy,
regardless of the choices made by the other players. In the
inducement systems shown earlier in Figure 7, cooperation is
a dominating strategy over defection. Regardless of the
level of cooperation of others, an individual receives a
higher payoff from cooperation than from defection. By
contrast, there is no dominating strategy for the inducement
system shown below in Figure 10.
The second concept of importance is that of an
equilibrium outcome. An equilibrium outcome is one where no
player can unilaterally change his strategy without
diminishing his own payoff, assuming that the other players
maintain their strategy. In Figure 7, the equilibrium
outcome occurs when all players use the dominating strategy
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Figure 10. Example of inducement system with no
dominating strategy.
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(c=10). This is a boundary equilibrium, since all of the
players adopt this strategy. Because there are no defectors
left to move to the dominating strategy, no one can improve
their payoff. In Figure 10, there are two boundary
equilibria outcomes 1) all cooperators (c=lO), and 2) all
defectors (d=lO). Note that for both of these equilibrium
outcomes, no player can change his strategy without lowering
his payoff.
An equilibrium can be either Pareto optimal or
deficient. An outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no other
outcome where at least one player is better off and where no
players are worse off. Conversely, a Pareto deficient
outcome is one for which at least one other outcome exists
which is better for at least one player and as good for all
other players. The inducement system shown in Figure 7 has
one equilibrium outcome (c=10) and that equilibrium is
Pareto optimal. Figure 10 shows an inducement system that
has both a deficient equilibrium (d=10) and a Pareto optimal
equilibrium (c=10).
The presence of an equilibrium does not ensure that the
equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Figure 11 shows an inducement
system that has a single deficient equilibrium (d=10). In
this figure, defection is a dominating strategy and the
equilibrium outcome occurs when all players defect. This
equilibrium outcome is deficient because each player
receives a higher payoff when all players cooperate (c=10).
Figure 11 is an example of an 10-person prisoner's dilemma.

""---·
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Figure 11. Example of inducement system with a
dominating strategy and a deficient equilibrium
outcome.
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Taxonomy of Games
Rappaport and Guyer (1966) developed a taxonomy of
2 X 2 games to describe the strategic features of these
games. In building their taxonomy, they made use of an
ordinal scale (versus interval scale) for defining payoffs.
The use of an ordinal scale allowed them to build a concise,
yet comprehensive taxonomy. However, the absence of an
interval scale required that they abandon the concept of a
mixed strategy. As a replacement, they developed the concept
of the natural outcome to describe these games. In
developing the concept of the natural outcome, several added
principles of rationality were used by these authors. They
are as follows:
1) If a player has a dominating strategy, he will
choose it.
2) If only one player has a dominating strategy, then
the other player will select the strategy that maximizes his
outcome assuming that the other player chooses their
dominating strategy.
3) If the game has a single Pareto optimal equilibrium,
then each player will choose the strategy that contains it.
4) If a dominating strategy does not exist, and there
is no Pareto equilibrium or more than one, then each player
will choose the strategy that contains his maximin outcome.
After defining the natural outcome, the above authors
used the concept to develop a taxonomy of the 78 possible
2 X 2 games. Of these 78 games, only the 12 symmetric games
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are of relevance to this study. Figure 12 shows the types of
games wbich are possible in this study and the category of
game into which they fall. The natural outcome is always
shown in the upper left corner of the payoff matrix.
GAMES WITH DOMINATING STRATEGY
No Conflict Games
4,4

3,2

4,4

3,1

4,4

2,3

2,3

1,1

1,3

2,2

3,2

1,1

Single Pareto Equilibrium Games
3,3

4,2

3,3

4,1

2,4

1,1

1,4

2,2

Single Deficient Equilibrium Game
2,2

4,1

1,4

3,3

GAMES WITH NO DOMINATING STRATEGY
No Conflict Games
4,4

2,1

4,4

1,3

4,4

1,2

1,2

3,3

3,1

2,2

2,1

3,3

Two Equilibria Games with Non-equilibrium outcome
3,3

2,4

2,2

3,4

2,2

4,3

4,2

1,1

4,3

1,1

3,4

1,1

Note: 4

=

Best, 1

=

Worst.

Figure 12. Taxonomy of symmetric 2-person games
(from Rappaport and Guyer 1966).
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For the present study, the 12 general games types shown
in Figure 12 result in 24 actual games - 12 where
cooperation is the natural outcome and 12 where defection is
the natural outcome. These games fall into the following
categories (Rappaport and Guyer, 1966):
1) pominating Strategy - No conflict. These are games
where there is a dominating strategy that results in an
equilibrium that yields the best outcome for all players.
This equilibrium is absolutely stable.
2) Dominating Strategy - Single Pareto Eguilibrium.
These games have a dominating strategy that results in a
single equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. Games in this
category are extremely stable.
3) Dominating Strategy - Single Deficient Eguilibrium.
These are games where the dominating strategy results in an
equilibrium which is a deficient outcome. The only game in
the category is the prisoner's dilemma. Games in this
category are strongly stable.
4) No Dominating Strategy - No Conflict. These are
games where there is no dominating strategy and there are
two equilibria, one of which yields the best outcome to both
players. These are no conflict games and the natural outcome
for these games is absolutely stable.
5) No pominating Strategy - Two Eguilibria Games with
Non-eguilibrium outcome. These are games where there is no
dominating strategy and where there are two Pareto
equilibria, neither of which is the natural outcome. Games
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in this category are unstable. The non-equilibrium outcome
for these games may be either a pure strategy of a mixed
strategy. In a mixed strategy, individuals ensure their
maximin payoffs by varying their choice of action with a
specified frequency. The optimum frequency for each action
is dependent on the actual values of the payoffs (interval
scale).
Because Rappaport and Guyer (1966) use an ordinal
scale, they are unable to determine which games have a mixed
strategy. Instead, they use the maximin outcome (based on
the outcomes from the pure strategies) to define the natural
outcome for these games. This is a weakness in their
classification scheme. They recognize the problem of the
mixed strategy and appropriately label the natural outcome
for such games as "unstable".
For the purposes of this study, the classification
scheme of Rappaport and Guyer (1966) must be modified to
apply to uniform n-person games. These modifications are a
part of the work done is this study. The modified game
categories are shown below.
1) Category I - Dominating Strategy - Single Pareto
Equilibrium. These games have a dominating strategy that
results in a single equilibrium which is Pareto optimal.
Games in this category are extremely stable.
This category includes the first two categories used
above to describe symmetric 2-person games. These two
categories are closely related; the only difference being
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that for the no conflict games, the Pareto equilibrium
results in the maximum possible payoff. Collapsing these
categories also allows for a clearer presentation of
results. Figure 13 shows four Category I games. Two of these
games have linear payoff functions and two have nonlinear
payoff functions. The games included examples of both
cooperation and defection as the natural outcome.
2) Category II - Dominating Strategy - Single Deficient
Equilibrium. For this category, the dominating strategy
results in an equilibrium which is a deficient outcome. The
games in the category are the prisoner's dilemma games.
Games in this category are strongly stable. Figure 14 shows
four examples of Category II games.
3) Category III - No Dominating Strategy - Pareto
Equilibrium outcome. These are games where there is no
dominating strategy and there are two boundary equilibria,
one of which is Pareto optimal. Figure 15 shows four
examples of category III games. Each of the Category III
games shown in Figure 15 have an intersection point for the
two payoff lines. Below the intersection point, defection is
a dominating strategy with a boundary equilibrium at d=10.
Above the intersection point, cooperation is a dominating
strategy and there is a boundary equilibrium at c=10.
While the natural outcome for these games is extremely
stable, it is potentially less accessible in the n-person
case than in the 2-person case. In 2-person games, an
individual can unilaterally adopt the strategy containing
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Figure 13. Examples of Categozy I games.
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the Pareto optimal equilibrium. The other player is then
faced with a choice of moving to the Pareto equilibrium or
choosing an inferior outcome. This property makes the Pareto
equilibrium very accessible in 2-person games. For n-person
games, however, a coalition of individuals is generally
needed to move the group from one equilibrium to the other.
The change in accessibility of the natural outcome makes
games in Category III less desirable in the n-person case
(n>2) than in the 2-person case.
For the inducement systems and social motives
considered in this study, one of the boundary equilibria was
always found to be Pareto optimal. While this is always the
case for linear payoff functions, it is not necessarily the
case for nonlinear payoff functions. For nonlinear payoff
functions, it is possible that both boundary equilibria are
deficient (i.e. there is a nonboundary outcome that is
Pareto optimal). According to the decision making rules
proposed by Rappaport and Guyer (1966), the individual would
choose the strategy that contains the their maximin outcome.
If interval scales were considered the maximin rule might
lead to a mixed strategy for these games. While these games
are not relevant to this study, they may occur in other
analyses of n-person uniform games. These types of games can
be treated as a new category - games with no dominating
strategy and deficient boundary equilibria.
4) Category IV - No Dominating Strategy Non-equilibrium outcome. These are games where there is no
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dominating strategy and where there are multiple nonboundary
equilibria, none of which is the natural outcome. Figure 16
show four examples of games form this category. Like
Category III games, there is an intersection point for the
payoff functions. However, below the intersection point
cooperation is a dominating strategy and above the
intersection point defection is a dominating strategy. This
creates an equilibrium outcome at the point of intersection.
Because individuals can be either cooperators or defectors,
there are multiple equilibria at the intersection point.
Note that Rappaport and Guyer's use of an ordinal scale
makes it impossible for them to determine whether the
maximin solution involves a mixed strategy or a pure
strategy for 2-person games from this category. Instead,
they determine the natural outcome based on which pure
strategy contains the maximin outcome. The maximin solution
based on the outcomes from the pure strategies may be
different than the maximin solution when mixed strategies
are considered. Because the natural outcome for games in
this category do not involve an equilibrium, these games are
considered to be unstable.
The four categories of games can be considered to form
a hierarchy based on the stability and accessibility of the
natural outcome. These properties influence the
effectiveness of the game in reaching and maintaining the
natural outcome. From a game theoretic perspective,
Category I games are the most stable, since they have a
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dominating strategy that leads to a Pareto optimal
equilibrium. Reaching this equilibrium only requires that
individuals pursue their self-interest. Therefore, for
inducement systems where cooperation is the natural outcome,
Category I games are preferred over the other categories of
games because of their effectiveness in achieving the
natural outcome. Conversely, Category I games are the least
preferred when defection is the natural outcome.
Category II games are second most preferred games,
since they have a dominating strategy and the equilibrium is
reached when individuals pursue the dominating strategy. The
third most preferred games are Category III games. This
category of games has two boundary equilibria, one of which
is Pareto optimal. The difficulty with this category of
games is that the presence of the second boundary equilibria
may keep the system from reaching the natural outcome. For
2-person games, the preferences for categories II & III
would be reversed, since the Pareto equilibrium is readily
accessible in the 2-person case. The least preferred
category of games is Category IV. These games have a natural
outcome that is not an equilibrium outcome. As a result
there is always a temptation for individuals to defect from
the natural outcome.
Phase I Analysis
In the first phase of analysis, the modified
classification system shown above was used to map the
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natural outcomes and game categories for the six classes of
inducement systems previously developed. This phase of the
analysis is based on the Individual motive. The values of
the parameters r, p and g were used as inputs into the
payoff formulas shown in Table II. The resulting payoffs
define a specific game, which can be classified in terms of
its natural outcome and game category. As an example,
consider the inducement system with absolute rewards and
group incentives and with the system parameters set at n=2,
r=0.5, and g=1.2. Because the inducement systems dealt with
in this study involve symmetric games, the payoffs for only
one of the players need to be indicated to define the
payoffs for all other players. The payoffs for player 1 from
this inducement system are shown in Figure 17.
Player 2

Player 1

C

D

c

0.7

0.1

D

0.6

0

Figure 17. Payoff matrix for a 2-person inducement
system using absolute rewards (r=0.5, g=1.2).
In this game, cooperation is a dominating strategy. The
single equilibrium (c=2) is Pareto optimal and also gives
each player his best outcome (0.7 utiles). This game falls
within Category I - games with a dominating strategy and a
single Pareto equilibrium.
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By altering the values of r and g, it is possible to
map the natural outcome and category of game over a range of
values. This results in a graph showing the regions over
which differing categories of games occur and whether
cooperation or defection is the natural outcome. Figure 18
shows such a mapping for 10-person inducement systems based
on competitive rewards and penalties plus group incentives.
This analysis was done for the same classes of inducement
systems shown in Table II. A complete set of mapping for the
10-person case for each of the six classes of inducement
systems is shown in Appendix A.
satisficing. Two variations to the Individual motive
were also analyzed. These variations are based on the
decision making theory of satisficing developed by Simon
(1976). Under Simon's theory, individuals only search for
alternative actions when their payoffs fall below a
threshold (satisfactory) level. In this analysis, the
threshold value is considered to be met when the value of
inducements exceeds the value of contributions.
Satisficing theory assumes that individuals do not
search for a new behavior as long as their outcomes remain
satisfactory. Because individuals begin as either
cooperators or defectors, two variations must be considered
1) initial cooperators, and 2) initial defectors. These two
initial behaviors require separate analyses. After selecting
the initial behavior, the analysis then determines whether
cooperation or defection is the natural outcome. Note that
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Figure 18. Map of natural outcomes for the Individual motive
based on competitive rewards and penalties.

87

the initial behavior and the natural outcome may be
different. The "satisficer's" payoff for the inducement
system being considered is then checked to see if it is
positive (satisfactory) for the satisficer's initial
behavior (cooperate or defect). If the payoff is positive,
the satisficer's initial behavior continues. If the payoff
is negative, the individual searches for a new behavior that
improves his outcomes. This search is assumed to result in
the individual changing his behavior to match the natural
outcome. Because this study is interested in the question of
how to promote cooperation, the focus of the satisficing
analysis is on determining when satisficing theory would
predict that individuals would depart from cooperation as
the natural outcome. Regions where defection is the natural
outcome are ignored in this portion of the analysis.
The analysis of initial cooperators differs slightly
from the analysis for initial defectors. In looking at
cooperation as the initial behavior, the important question
is whether cooperators receive a positive outcome from
cooperation. The analysis assumes that all other individuals
choose to cooperate when calculating whether

c~operation

results in a positive outcome. When looking at defection,
however, the question is whether there is alltY possibility
that a defector would receive a positive out:come when
cooperation is the natural outcome. The ana.lysis, therefore,
considers all possible levels of cooperation and defection
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to determine whether defectors could receive a positive
outcome.
Figures 19 & 20 show the results of this analysis for
inducement systems using competitive rewards and penalties.
In Figure 19, the initial behavior is defection. The crosshatched area shows the inducement systems where defectors
could receive a positive payoff, even though cooperation is
the natural outcome. In Figure 20, the initial behavior is
cooperation. The cross-hatched area shows the inducement
systems where cooperation is the natural outcome and where
cooperators receive a positive payoff. The complete set of
results for the satisficing analysis is included in Appendix
A. Two maps are included for each of the six classes of
inducement systems based on cooperation and defection as the
initial behaviors.
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Phase II Analysis
The first phase of analysis was based on the payoff
formulas from Table II. These payoffs are equivalent to the
Individual motive (self-maximization). The second phase of
analysis uses the same methods to analyze five additional
social motives 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism,_
4) Equity, and 5) Aggression. Table III gives the payoff
formulas used to represent these motives. A typical set of
results for the five motives are shown in Figures 21-25.
These results are based on the use of competitive rewards
and penalties and a 10-person group. Similar maps were
developed for each of the six classes of inducement systems
and the five social motives considered in phase II. The
complete set of results for the second phase of analysis are
shown in Appendix B •
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Phase III Analysis
The third phase of the analysis uses ideas from
theoretical biology to examine the evolution of social
motives in response to the environment created by the
inducement system of the organization. Theoretical
biologists have made use of evolutionary game theory to
provide explanations for the social behavior of animals
(Dawkins,

1976~

and Maynard-Smith, 1982). In applying

evolutionary game theory to the study of organizational
inducements, the approach used by theoretical biologists
must be modified to reflect the differences between the
organizational environment and the natural environment. The
most significant of these differences is that organizational
behaviors occur over a short period of time when compared
with the multitude of generations associated with genetic
evolution. These organizational behaviors are considered to
be primarily shaped through organizational learning.
Because behaviors are considered to evolve through
learning rather than reproductive success, an organizational
fitness measure must be found to replace Darwinian fitness
(the frequency of a gene in the population). The fitness
measure used in this study is the frequency with which
individuals use a particular social motive in choosing
between cooperation and defection.
In the model developed for this study, learning
replaces natural selection in transmitting behaviors. This
leads to the question of how this learning occurs. Earlier,
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it was discussed that social motives could be interpreted as
1) genuine preferences, or 2) strategies for maximizing
material payoffs. These alternative interpretations lead to
differing assumptions about how individual learning occurs
in response to an organizational inducement system.
When social motives are interpreted as preferences,
this study assumes that individuals continue to make use of
a motive as long as they find that motive's social outcomes
to be satisfactory. This occurs when individuals receive
favored outcomes, as defined by the motive's preferences. As
an example, a player with the social motive of Altruism
might be "satisfied" with a smaller personal payoff
(inducements less contributions) provided that his actions
resulted in a larger payoff to the group. If social motives
reflect preferences, then such a player might continue to
adopt this motive, even though a larger material payoff
might result from another social motive. In this study, we
will assume that the degree of satisfaction with a motive
will influence the frequency with which it is used during
the next inducement period. A player will be satisfied when
he receives the best possible outcome and unsatisfied when
he receives the worst possible outcome.
When social motives are interpreted as strategies for
maximizing personal payoffs, the frequency of motives will
be assumed to depend upon the actual payoffs to the
individual (inducements less contributions). Under this.
interpretation, the fitness of a social motive depends only
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upon its relative success in maximizing inducements less
contributions when compared against other motives. This
measure of fitness does not depend on whether the
preferences of the motive are satisfied.
simulation Models. In developing simulation models for
these alternative interpretations of social motives, the
organization is considered to be populated by individuals
making choices between cooperation and defection based on
the Individual motive and the five social motives described
earlier. The frequencies with which these motives are used
to choose between cooperation and defection are variable.
The models do not assign the motives to individuals, but
treats them as frequencies within the entire population. As
an example, if a given motive had a frequency of 0.5 in the
population, it might be used all of the time by half of the
population or might be used by each individual half of the
time.
Each round (k) in the simulation represents one
inducement period for the organization. The frequency
(f(i,k)) with which each motive (i) is used can be set from
0.0 to 1.0. The initial values of f(i,k) are set such that
all six motives start out with an equal frequency (i.e.
f(i,0)=0.167). The expected payoffs for successive rounds
are calculated using the level of cooperation from the
previous round, with no memory of prior results. The
calculation of the expected payoffs for cooperation
(EPC(i,c(k-1))) and defection (EPC(i,c(k-1))) is based on
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the level of cooperation in the prior round. The calculation
assumes that the level of cooperation of others remains
unchanged from the previous round.
Using these expected payoffs, a comparison is made
between the expected payoffs for cooperation (EPC(i,c(k-1)))
and defection (EPD(i,c(k-1))) for each of the motives. The

.

choice to behave as a cooperator (b(i,k)=1) or a defector
(b(i,k)=O) is based upon whether cooperation or defection
has the larger payoff. The initial values of b(i,k) for each
motive are based on the natural outcome from the analysis
done in phases I and II (i.e. b(i,0)=1 if the natural
outcome for motive i is cooperation, otherwise b(i,O)=O)".
The new level of cooperation (c(k)) is then calculated
using the prior frequencies for each of the motives and each
motive's choice to cooperate or defect for this round. Using
this information the actual payoffs for cooperation
(PC(i,k)) and defection (PD(i,k)) are calculated for each of
the motives. These calculations are based on the equations
shown earlier in Tables II and III.
The model then determines the relative payoff for each
motive compared to the payoff for the other motives during
that round. The relative payoffs are based on a scale (0.01.0) derived from the best and worst possible outcomes
(Pmax(i) and Pmin(i)). Pmax(i) is the maximum payoff for
motive i from either cooperation or defection for all
possible levels of cooperation. For cooperators, the
relative payoff P(i,k)=(PC(j,k)-Pmin(j))/(Pmax(j)-Pmin(j)).
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For defectors, P(i,k)=(PD(j,k)-Pmin(j))/(Pmax<j)-Pmin(j)).
Note that the relative payoff scale can be based on the
payoff functions for the motive being analyzed (i=j) or the
payoff functions for a different social motive.
Two models were developed in this study which use
different payoff functions in determining the relative
payoffs. The first model is based on interpreting motives as
preferences. This model calculates the relative payoff for
each motive based on the payoff functions for that motive
(i=j). The second model interprets motives as strategies for
maximizing individual payoffs. This model calculates
relative payoffs based on the Individual motive (i.e. based
on what individuals receive themselves, with no regard to
the payoffs to others).
The first model is referred to as the "Satisfaction
Model", since individuals adopt motives that are successful
in satisfying the preferences of the motive. The second
model is labeled the "Fitness model", since individuals
choose motives that succeed in acquiring personal rewards
linked to the individual's future fitness. These relative
payoffs (P(i,k)) are then used to determine the frequencies
of the six motives for the next round. The formula used to
calculate the new frequencies is shown below:
f(i,k)=f(i,(k-l))*P(i,k)/SUM(f(i,(k-i))*P(i,k)).
Figure 26 shows the flowchart and formulas used in
developing the two simulation models.
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Motive Evolution. The two simulation models shown in
Figure 26 were used to determine the evolution of each
motive and the steady-state level of cooperation. The
frequencies (f) of the six motives were initially be set
equal to one another (f=0 •.167) and then allowed to evolve
based on each strategy's payoffs. At the end of each round,
the relative payoffs for each social motive was determined
and the frequency of that motive adjusted. Each simulation
was ran until equilibrium frequencies for each of the
motives were reached. The steady-state level of cooperation
was also determined for each of the simulations.
Figure 27 illustrates the results from one such
simulation. The results are for the Satisfaction model and a
10-person inducement system using competitive rewards and
penalties (r=1.25, p=1.25, g=0.5). In this simulation, the
level of cooperation increased from 0.5 to 1.0. In the
process, the Aggression motive displaced the other motives.
The complete set of results for phase III are shown in
Appendix

c.
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Start Round
I

Input model parameters (r,p,g) and initial
values of cooperation, c(O), b(i,O)
and frequencies of motives, f(i,O)
I
Calculate expected payoffs for cooperation
and defection for each motive based on the
prior level of cooperation; EPC(i,c(k-1))
and EPD(i,c(k-1))
I
Determine behavior (cooperate or defect)
for each motive,
b(i,k)=1 if EPC(i,c(k-l))>EPD(i,c(k-1))
b(i,k)=O if EPC(i,c(k-l))<EPD(i,c(k-1))
I
Calculate actual level of cooperation,
c(k)=SUM(f(i,(k-l))*b(i,k))
I
Calculate payoffs (P(i,k)) for motives
based on choice of simulation model
I
I
Satisfaction Model
If b(i,k)=l,
P(i,k)=(PC(i,c(k))-Pmin(i))
/(Pmax(i)-Pmin(i))
If b(i,k)=O,
P(i,k)=(PD(i,c(k))-Pmin(i))
/(Pmax(i)-Pmin(i))
Fitness Model
If b(i,k)=l,
P(i,k)=(PC(Indiv.,c(k))-Pmin(Indiv.))
/(Pmax(Indiv.)-Pmin(Indiv.))
If b(i,k)=O,
P(i,k)=(PD(Indiv.,c(k))-Pmin(Indiv.))
/(Pmax(Indiv.)-Pmin(Indiv.))
I
I
Adjust frequencies of each motive, f(i,k)=
f(i,(k-1))*P(i,k)/SUM(f(i,(k-l))*P(i,k)
I

End Round
Figure 26. Simulation flowchart and formulas.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The results from the three phases of analysis outlined
in Chapter III are presented in this chapter. The results of
the first two phases of analysis define the regions where
cooperation and defection are the natural outcomes for the
six classes of inducement systems being considered. The
results from phase I of the analysis cover the Individual
motive and two variations based on the theory of satisficing
(Simon, 1976). The results from phase II cover the other
social motives 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism,
4) Equity, and 5) Aggression.
The results of the third phase of analysis show the
evolution of motives in response to a particular inducement
system. These results illustrate how the frequencies of the
social motives might evolve and what the net effect would be
on the steady-state level of group cooperation. Results are
presented for two models, one based on motive fitness
(Fitness model) and the other on motive satisfaction
(Satisfaction model).
Inducement systems
Six classes of inducement systems were developed for
use in this study (see Table II). These six classes make use
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of group incentives in combination with rewards and/or
penalties. The rewards and penalties are based on either
absolute or competitive standards. While these inducements
systems can be used to represent a wide variety of realworld inducements, they are not inclusive of all possible
types of inducement systems. The equations used to develop
the six classes of inducement systems are based on idealized
incentives. Real-world inducement systems are rarely as
well-defined as the equations for the various inducement
systems would indicate. Competitive incentives, in
particular, are often based on subjective judgements and
ill-defined payoffs. While a more complete analysis would
consider more classes of inducement systems and alternative
formulations for individual and group incentives, the
classes of inducement systems presented in this study are
useful in understanding 1) how various incentives work
together to influence motivation, and 2) what behaviors
might follow from the choice of competitive incentives over
absolute incentives.
While a comprehensive analysis of inducement systems is
beyond the scope of this study, it is important to know
whether the six classes of inducement systems being studied
describe a sufficiently diverse cross-section of inducement
systems. A partial answer to this question can be obtained
by checking to see if the four categories of uniform
n-person games discussed in Chapter III occur for the
Individual motive. Table IV summarizes the diversity of game
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categories that occur for each of the six classes of
inducement systems based on an analysis of 10-person groups
for the six classes of inducement systems being considered.
TABLE IV
GAME CATEGORIES
FOR THE SIX CLASSES OF INDUCEMENTS SYSTEMS
BASED ON 10-PERSON GROUP
Natural outcome

Class

Cooperate

Defect

I
I
I

I,II
I,II
I,II

I,IV
I,III
I,II

I,II,IV
I,II,III
I,II

Absolute
Rewards
Penalties
Both
Competitive
Rewards
Penalties
Both

Note: The same categories of games occur for the 2-person
case.
As can be seen from Table IV, each of the four
categories of games is included under at least one of the
six classes of inducement systems for both the natural
outcome of cooperation and defection. While other formulas
for the incentives could be considered, they would not
result in any new categories of games. This is at least a
suggestive argument that the six classes of inducement
systems are adequate for the general investigation being
done in this research.
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Phase I Results
The cornerstone of this research is the analysis of the
Individual motive. The mathematical representation of this
motive is based directly upon the payoffs to the individual
from the inducement system under consideration. This motive
finds its basis in the classical view of economic man as a
utility maximizer. This approach is consistent with the
approach of expectancy theory.
Absolute Rewards and/or Penalties. Three classes of
inducement systems based on absolute incentives were
considered: 1) absolute rewards, 2) absolute penalties, and
3) absolute rewards and penalties. These inducement systems
use fixed incentives to reward andjor penalize individuals
based on their contributions relative to a fixed standard of
contributions defined as cooperation.
Figures 28 & 29 show the payoff functions for the
Individual motive for two inducement systems using absolute
rewards andjor penalties (r=1.5, p=O.O, g=O.S and r=O.O,
p=1.5, g=0.5). The payoff functions for these two inducement
systems are quite similar, the only difference being an
offset resulting from the use of rewards in one case and
penalties in the other. From a game theoretic perspective,
this offset is unimportant. Because game theory is based on
an interval scale, games that differ by a fixed offset are
equivalent to one another. In general, the game theoretic
analysis of any two inducement systems using absolute
rewards andjor penalties will be equivalent if the sums of
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the reward and penalty factors are equal (e.g. r=1.5, p=O.O
is equivalent to r=o.o, p=1.5) and the group incentive
factors are equal. This finding is reflected in the results
shown in Appendix A for the Individual motive.
Figure 30 shows the results of the analysis of the
Individual motive for the 10-person case. Three categories
of games occur for the Individual motive for inducement
systems based on absolute rewards andjor penalties - two
where defection is the natural outcome and one where
cooperation is the natural outcome.
To simplify the discussion of the regions that come out
of this study, a shorthand notation is used to label the
natural outcome and category of game associated with each
region. This shorthand uses the letter "C" or the letter "D"
to indicate whether cooperation or defection is the natural
outcome. The letter is followed by a Roman numeral
indicating what game category is involved. As an example, an
inducement systems from a CII region would have cooperation
as the natural outcome and would be a category II game.
Two regions have defection as the natural outcome. The
first region (DI) has values of r,p and g such that
(r+p+g)<1.0. For inducement systems within this region,
defection is a dominating strategy and the equilibrium
outcome is Pareto optimal. This inducement system can be
represented by a Category I game.
An example of an inducement system from this region is
shown in Figure 31 (r=0.125, p=0.125, g=0.25). Note that the
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payoff line for cooperation lies below the payoff line for
defection. This means that regardless of the level of
cooperation of others, an individual always receives a
higher payoff by choosing to defect. As a result, defection
is a dominating strategy. Because defection is a dominating
strategy, the natural outcome is for each individual to
defect. This leads to a single equilibrium (c=O) and that
equilibrium is Pareto optimal (i.e. there is no other
outcome where each individual receives an equal or better
payoff).
The second region (DII) where defection is the natural
outcome includes the area with values of r,p and g such that
(r+p+g)>1.0 and r+p+(g/10)<1.0. Inducement systems in this
region fall within Category II, games where there is a
dominating strategy that leads to a deficient outcome. As an
example, consider the inducement system with r=0.25, p=0.25,
g=2.0 as shown in Figure 32. For inducement systems in this
region, defection is the dominating strategy. The
equilibrium outcome occurs when each individual defects
(c=O). Unlike the region discussed above, this equilibrium
is deficient (i.e. there is another outcome (c=10) where
each individual receives a better payoff). Inducement
systems in this region fall within the class of games
commonly known as "prisoner's dilemma" games.
outside of these two regions of defection, cooperation
is the natural outcome. Inducement systems with absolute
rewards and/or penalties lead to cooperation as the natural
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outcome when r+p+(g/10)>1.0. These inducement systems fall
within category I. An example of an inducement system in
this region (CI) is shown in Figure 33 (r=0.75, p=0.75,
g=1.0). As can be seen, cooperation is a dominating strategy
and the equilibrium outcome (c=10) is Pareto optimal.
The regions defined above are based on the analysis of
inducement systems where the group size is ten (n=10). To
determine the region where cooperation is the natural
outcome for the general n-person case, consider the payoff
functions for cooperation and defection shown below:
C(c)=r+g(c/n)-1
D(c)=-p+g(c/n)
Note: The payoff functions are taken from
Table II. The cost of contributions (-1.0 utiles)
has been included in the payoff for cooperators.
For cooperation to be a dominating strategy, the payoff
for cooperation must exceed the payoff for defection for all
levels of cooperation and therefore:
C(c)>D(c-1)
r+g(cjn)-1>-p+g((c-1)/n)
r+p+g((c-(c-1))/n)>1
r+p+(g/n)>1
Note: If the level of cooperation of others is c,
a cooperator's choice to defect decreases the
level of cooperation to c-1, while the choice to
continue to cooperate does not alter the level of
cooperation.
The above equations show that for inducement systems
based on absolute rewards andjor penalties, cooperation will
be a dominating strategy when the value of r+p+(g/n) exceeds
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the cost of the added effort for cooperation. In this study,
the cost of cooperation has been used to define the utility
scale. It is defined as having a value of -1.0 utiles.
Competitive Rewards. The analysis of the three classes
of inducement systems based on competitive rewards andjor
penalties is more complex than the analysis of inducement
systems using absolute rewards and/or penalties. Unlike the
case with absolute rewards andjor penalties, competitive
rewards result in different game categories than do
competitive penalties. Figures 34 & 35 show two inducement
systems (r=1.5, p=O, g=O.S and r=O, p=1.5, g=O.S), with
values of r,p and g found earlier to lead to equivalent·
games for inducement systems using absolute rewards and
penalties. Note the dissimilarities between these two
inducement systems when compared to Figures 28 & 29. These
differences occur because competitive rewards shift the
slope of the payoff line for cooperators, while competitive
penalties shift the slope of the payoff line for defectors.
Recall that absolute rewards and penalties do not change the
slope of either payoff line. Because of these differences,
it is necessary to discuss the three classes of inducement
systems based on competitive rewards andjor penalties
separately.
The use of competitive rewards leads to five regions,
three where defection is the natural outcome (DI, DII & DIV)
and two where cooperation is the natural outcome (CI & CIV).
These regions are as shown in Figure 36. Two of the regions
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of defection (DI & DII) are similar to the regions of
defection which occur for the inducement systems based on
absolute rewards and penalties. This should not be
surprising, since when the values of r and p approach zero,
the payoffs for systems based on absolute rewards and
systems based on competitive rewards are approximately
equal.
The first of these regions (DI) has values of r and g
such that r<(10-g)/9 and g<1.0. This region has a dominating
strategy of defection and the natural outcome is Pareto
optimal. The second region (DII) has values of r and g such
that r<(10-g)/9 and g>1.0. This region has a dominating
strategy of defection and the equilibrium outcome (c=O) is
deficient.
The third region (DIV) includes Category IV games,
where defection is the natural outcome. This region has
values of g between

o.o and 1.0 and values of r such that

r>(10-g)/9. While defection is the natural outcome for this
region, it is not a dominating strategy. Consider, for
example, the inducement system shown in Figure 37
(r=1.5, g=0.5). When the level of cooperation exceeds 0.366,
defection has a higher payoff than cooperation. Conversely,
when the level of cooperation is less than 0.366,
cooperation has the better payoff.
In addition to there being no dominating strategy,
neither pure cooperation (c=10) or pure defection (c=O) is
an equilibrium outcome. In general, the payoff lines for
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inducement systems in this region intersect when cjn is
equal to 1-(1-g/n)jr. This result is found as follows:
C(c)=D(c-1)
g(cjn)+r(1-c/n)-1=g((c-1)/n)
r(1-c/n)=1-g/n
cjn=1-(1-g/n)/r
Note that this is an equilibrium outcome, since
changing from cooperation to defection or defection to
cooperation does not affect one's payoffs. It should also be
noted that the equilibrium outcome is different than the
outcome where both cooperators and defectors receive equal
payoffs. The payoffs for cooperation and defection are equal
when cjn=1-1/r.
Because there is no dominating strategy and neither
pure defection or cooperation is a Pareto optimal outcome,
the choice of the natural outcome is based on the maximin
strategy. The maximin strategy chooses the outcome that
gives the best of the worst possible outcomes. For the
inducement system shown in Figure 37, the worst outcome from
defection (c=O) is preferred over the worst outcome from
cooperation (c=10). Defection is the maximin strategy and
the natural outcome for inducement systems in this region.
The concept of the natural outcome was developed by
Rappaport and Guyer (1966) as a tool for classifying games.
Their classification system is based on the ordinality of
payoffs (ordinal scale) and does not rely on the actual
values of the payoffs (interval scale). As a result of using
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an ordinal scale, these authors were unable to make use of
the concept of a mixed strategy. This limitation is
particularly apparent when dealing with games falling within
category IV.
While neither pure strategy results in an equilibrium
outcome, a solution does exist if mixed strategies are
considered. A mixed strategy is one where alternative
choices are made with a specified probability or frequency.
The solution for the mixed strategy for an inducement system
from this region (r=1.5, g=0.5) is shown graphically in
Figure 38. Refer to Rubinstein (1975) for a discussion of
this graphical method of analysis.
The two vertical axes show the payoffs for cooperation
C(c) and defection D(d+1) for all possible values of c
(i.e. c=O to c=10). The connecting lines show the mixed
strategy payoffs for choosing cooperation (C(c)) with a
frequency of f and choosing defection (D(d+1)) with
frequency 1-f. The mixed strategy is found by determining
the value of f that yields the highest maximin payoff from
the mixed strategy payoff lines (see Figure 38). For the
inducement system being shown (r=1.5, g=0.5) the mixed
strategy occurs when individuals cooperate with a frequency
of f=0.33 and defect with a frequency of f=0.67. Note that
this is a nonequilibrium outcome, since defectors would do
better by switching to cooperation (see Figure 37).
The payoff lines shown in Figure 38 are somewhat unique
in that each line intersects at a common point. This is a
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general result that can be shown by considering the solution
for the intersection of the payoff lines for any two
successive levels of cooperation, c and c+1. The
intersection point (f) is found as follows:
fC(c)+(1-f)D(d+1)=fC(c+1)+(1-f)D(d)
f(g(c/n)+r(1-c/n)-1)=f(g((c+1)/n)+r(1-(c+1)/n)-1)
+(1-f)g(c-1)/n
+(1-f)g(c/n)
fg(cjn)+fr-fr(c/n)-f=fg(c+1)/nfr-fr(c+1)/n-f
+f(c-1)/n-fg(c-1)/n f(c/n)-fg(c/n)
fg(c/n)-fr(cjn)+g(cjn)=fg(c/n)+fg/n-fr(c/n)
-g;n-fg(c/n)+fgjn
-fr/n+g(cjn)-fg(c/n)
-gjn=-fr/n
fr=g
f=g/r
Because the mixed strategy payoff lines for any two
successive levels of cooperation intersect at gjr, it is
also the case that the mixed strategy payoff lines for every
level of cooperation intersect at gjr. As a result, the
maximin strategy has a value of f equal to gjr.
In addition to the three categories of games where
defection is the natural outcome, this class of inducement
systems has two regions where cooperation is the natural
outcome (CI & CIV). The easier of these two regions to
understand occurs when the value of the group incentive
factor is greater than the number of individuals in the
group (i.e. g>10). Cooperation is a dominating strategy for
this region (CI) and the resulting equilibrium outcome is
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Pareto optimal (Category I). This result occurs regardless
of the value of the reward factor (r).
The boundaries of this region in the n-person case are
found by determining what values of r and g are needed for
cooperation to be a dominating strategy. For cooperation to
be a dominating strategy, the payoff for cooperation must
exceed the payoff for defection for all levels of
cooperation and therefore:
C(c)>D(c-1)
g(c/n)+r(1-c/n)-1>g((c-1)/n)
gc+r(n-c)-n>gc-g
r(n-c)+g>n
Since (n-c)>O and

r~o,

the value of

r(n-c)~o.o.

Because

dominance requires that C(c)>D(c-1) for every level of c and
because the minimum value or n-c is zero, it is true that:
g>n
This is a general result for all group sizes. It should
be apparent, however, that when the size of the group is
large, the organization must use equally large group
incentives (g>n) to fall within this region. Note that when
the value of g is equal to n, then gjn=1.0 and the cost of
contributing is compensated for by the group incentive.
The second and more interesting region of cooperation
(CIV) is the area with values of r such that r>(10-g)/9 and
values of g such that 1.0<g<10. This region contains
inducement systems which fall within Category IV - games
with no dominating strategy and a natural outcome that is
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not an equilibrium outcome. consider the inducement system
with r=3.0, p=O.O, g=2.0 as shown in Figure 39. When the
level of cooperation (c/n) exceeds 1-(1-g/n)/r, then it is
preferable to defect. However, when the level of cooperation
is less than 1-(1-gjn)/r, then it is better to cooperate.
Neither pure cooperation or pure defection_ is an equilibrium
outcome and the natural outcome is based on choosing the
strategy that gives the maximin outcome.
The maximin solution for this region is more complex
than for the DIV region discussed earlier. The mixed
strategy for the DIV region was found to occur when the
frequency of cooperation (f) was equal to gjr. The same
solution for the mixed strategy holds for the CIV region.
However, a portion of the CIV region has values of gjr>1.0.
Since a mixed strategy must have a value of f between

o.o

and 1.0, the natural outcome for this area is a pure
strategy. Figure 40 shows an inducement system
(r=1.5, g=2.0) with gjr>1.0 and Figure 41 shows the
graphical solution for the same inducement system. The
maximin payoff (0.55 utiles) occurs when each individual
cooperates (f=1.0).
Games from the CIV region are preemption games. The
most famous of these is "chicken" (Kahn, 1965). Figure 42
shows the payoff matrix for a 2-person game of chicken based
on an inducement system using competitive rewards (r=1.2,
g=1.5). Both CD and DC are Pareto optimal equilibrium. These
games are called preemption games because the first person
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to defect receives the best payoff. Note that the natural
outcome cc is also Pareto optimal, but that it is not an
equilibrium outcome. It is also interesting to note that cc
is Pareto optimal when g>r.
Player 2

Player 1

C

D

c

0.5

0.35

D

0.75

0.0

Figure 42. Payoff matrix for a 2-person category
IV game based on competitive rewards (r=1.2
g=1.5).
Finding the boundaries of the category IV regions
(DIV & CIV) for the n-person case involves two steps. The
first is to find the boundaries with the two regions with
dominating strategies must be determined. The region where
cooperation is the dominating strategy (CI) was found
earlier to be g>n. The region where defection is a
dominating strategy is found as follows:
C(c)<D(c-1) for c=1 to c=10
g(c/n)+r(1-c/n)-1<g(c-1)/n
gc+r(n-c)-n<gc-g
r(n-c)<n-g
r<(n-g)/(n-c)
Since C(c)<D(c-1) must be true for all levels of
cooperation (c=1 to c=10) and because (n-c) is largest when
c=1, then:
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r<(n-g)/(n-1)
The second step is to determine when cooperation is the
maximin strategy. For cooperation to be the maximin
strategy, the minimum payoff for cooperation must be greater
than the minimum payoff for defection. Because this
inducement system has no penalties, the minimum payoff for
defection occurs when c=O, D(O)=g(O/n)=O.O. For the minimum
payoff for cooperation to exceed

o.o, then:

C(c)>O.O
g(cjn)+r(1-cjn)-l>O.O
g(cjn)+r(l-cjn)>l
When g>1.0, C(c) will be greater than 0.0 for all
values of c and, therefore, cooperation will be a dominating
strategy. When the value of g<l.O, then the minimum payoff
for cooperation will occur when c=n. But when c=n, then
cjn=1.0, and therefore:
g(1)+r(1-1)-1>0.0
g>1.0
Therefore, cooperation is the natural outcome when
g>1.0. In summary, the region with Category IV games has
values of rand g such that, l.O<g<n and r>(n-g)/(n-1). When
g<1.0 defection is the natural outcome (DIV), and when g>l.O
cooperation is the natural outcome (CIV).
Competitive Penalties. The use of competitive penalties
leads to inducement systems which fall within five regions
as shown in Figure 43. The boundaries of these regions are
identical to the boundaries of the regions that arise from
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the use of competitive rewards. The categories of games and
natural outcomes are also the same for three of the regions
1) the DI region where r<(10-g)/9 and g<1.0, 2) the DII
region where r<(10-g)/9 and g>1.0, and 3) the CI region
where g>10.
There are two regions (DIII & CIII) where the game
categories for inducement systems using competitive rewards
differ from those using competitive penalties. The first is
the DIII region with values of g between o and 1.0 and
values of r such that r>(10-g)/9. These are inducement
systems where there is no dominating strategy, but where
there is a Pareto optimal equilibrium (d=10). Figure 44
shows a typical inducement system from this region (p=2.0,
g=0.5).
The point at which the payoff lines for cooperation and
defection intersect in Figure 44 occurs when C(c)=D(c-1).
The value of cjn is found as follows:
C(c)=D(c-1)
g(c/n)-1=g((c-1)/n)-p((c-1)/n)
-1+g/n=-p((c-1)/n)
c;n-1/n=(1-g/n)/p
cjn=1/n+(1-g/n)/p
Note that when the value of cjn is greater than
1/n+(1-g/n)/p, then the payoffs for cooperation exceed the
payoffs for defection. Defectors should, therefore, be
expected to switch to cooperation. This causes the system to
move towards the deficient equilibrium at c=10. conversely,
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when the level of cooperation is less than 1/n+(1-g/n)/p,
then defection is preferable to cooperation and the system
should move towards the second equilibrium point at d=10.
For the Inducement system shown in Figure 44, the
choice of defection as the natural outcome hinges on the
fact that defection leads to a Pareto optimal equilibrium
(d=10). It should be noted, however, that the argument for
the Pareto optimal equilibrium as the natural outcome is
weaker for the n-person case (n>2) than for the 2-person
case. Consider as an example, the payoff matrix for a
typical 2-person game from Category III as shown in
Figure 45.
Player 2
C

Player 1

c

-0.5

D

-0.75

D

-0.75
0.0

Figure 45. Payoff matrix for a 2-person Category
III game based on competitive penalties
(p=2.0, g=0.5).
For this game, the Pareto equilibrium occurs when both
players choose to defect. This outcome is easily reached in
the 2-person case, since when either player defects the
other player is reduced to choosing between the second best
outcome (defect) and the worst outcome (cooperate). Unless
the second player violates norms of rationality, the first
player's defection should result in both players defecting.

139
Contrast this situation with what happens when only one
player defects (d=l) in the inducement system shown in
Figure 44. As can be seen, the remainder of the players will
to do better by continuing to cooperate than by switching to
defection. This will continue to be true until enough
individuals defect to cause the level of cooperation to
exceed 1/n+(1-gjn)jp. At that point, any remaining
cooperators will be better off by defecting. The Pareto
optimal equilibrium will be reached as these cooperators
switch to defection. While the choice of the Pareto optimal
equilibrium as the natural outcome has strong appeal, the
accessibility of this outcome in the n-person case for
Category III games can be problematic. This is a situation
where the presence of strong group norms might help the
group to reach a better outcome than might be possible
through individual actions.
The last region to be discussed for inducement systems
based on competitive penalties is the CIII region. This
region has values of g between 1.0 and n and values of r
such that r>(10-g)j9. The boundary of this region for the
n-person case can be found using the same steps used to find
the boundaries of the category IV region for inducement
systems using competitive rewards. Using this approach, the
CIII region has values of p and g such that p>(n-g)/(n-1)
and 1.0<g<n. Like the DIII region, the payoff lines for
inducement systems from the CIII region have an intersection
point at 1/n+(1-g/n)jp. When cjn<1/n+(1-gjn)/p defection is
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a dominating strategy. When cjn>1/n+(1-g/n)/p cooperation is
a dominating strategy.
Competitive Rewards and Penalties. Competitive rewards
and penalties can be used jointly as well as singly to
create inducement systems. When considering inducement
systems using both rewards and penalties, the relative
values of the reward factor (r) and the penalty factor (p)
must be established. For the purposes of this study, the
reward factor is taken to be equal to the penalty factor
(r=p). This results in inducement systems that are furthest
from the two classes of inducements considered earlier. It
also results in payoff lines for cooperation and defection
which are parallel. As a result, there is always a
dominating strategy (unless the payoff lines are equal) and
all inducement systems are either Category I or Category II
games.
Figure 46 shows the map of game categories that occur
for the Individual motive for inducement systems with
competitive rewards and penalties. Four regions occur, two
of which have defection as the natural outcome (DI & DII).
These regions have the same boundaries and game categories
that occur when either rewards or penalties are used.
The remaining two regions (CI & CII) have cooperation
as the natural outcome. When the value of g is greater than
1.0 (g>1.0) and the values of r and p are such that
(r+p)/2>(10-g)/9, then cooperation is a dominating strategy
and the equilibrium outcome (c=10) is Pareto optimal. This
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is a CI region. Figure 47 shows an inducement system from
this region, r=1.0, p=1.0, g=2.0. For the n-person case, the
CI region has values of r,p and g such that
(r+p)/2>(n-g)/(n-1) and g>1.0.
The remaining region (CII) also has a dominating
strategy of cooperation. However, unlike the other region of
cooperation (CI), the equilibrium outcome for this CII
region is deficient rather than Pareto optimal. The
boundaries of the CII region are g<1.0 and (r+p)/2>(10-g)/9.
For the n-person case, the region has values of r,p and g
such that (r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-1) and g<1.0.
The interesting result from this region is that the
behavior labeled as "cooperation" is a dominating strategy
that results in a deficient outcome. This is an apparent
reversal of the normal prisoner's dilemma, where "defection"
is the dominating strategy that leads to a deficient
outcome. One explanation for this role reversal is the fact
that ••cooperation", as used in this study, means cooperation
with the organization rather than cooperation with other
individuals. To an extent, the reversal is an artifact of
the way game theoreticians label choices in the prisoner's
dilemma game. Nevertheless, there are few real-world
examples of situations where the pursuit of group or
organizational goals is individually rational but
collectively irrational. Before adopting an inducement
system from the CII region, organizations should consider
the ethics and long-term practicality of using an inducement
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system that sets organizational interests against the
collective interests of individuals.
A summary of the regions where cooperation is the
natural outcome for each of the six classes of inducement
systems is shown in Table V. The game categories and
boundaries for each region of cooperation are given based on
the n-person case.
TABLE V
GAME CATEGORIES AND BOUNDARIES
FOR REGIONS WITH COOPERATION AS THE NATURAL OUTCOME
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MOTIVE
Class
Absolute

Boundaries

Rewards
Category I

r+(g/n)>l.O

Penalties
Category I

p+(g/n)>l.O

Both
Category I

r+p+(g/n)>1.0

Competitive
Rewards
Category I
Category IV

g>n
1.0<g<n and r>(g-n)/(n-1)

Penalties
Category I
Category III

g>n
1.0<g<n and p>(g-n)/(n-1)

Both
Category I
Category II

g>1.0 and (r+p)/2>(g-n)/(n-1)
g<1.0 and (r+p)/2>(g-n)/(n-1)

Inducement System Costs. To apply the results from the
preceding section to real-world organizations, it is
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necessary to understand the costs of achieving a given level
of cooperation for a specific inducement system.
Organizations are typically interested in increasing the
level of individual cooperation with organizational goals at
the minimum cost to the organization. It is assumed,
therefore, that the organization will search for those
inducement systems that result in cooperation as the natural
outcome and which have the lowest costs to the organization.
Figures 48 & 49 show the cost isocurves for inducement
systems based on 1) absolute rewards and/or penalties, and
2) competitive rewards and/or penalties. These cost curves
assume that the natural outcome is cooperation and that each
individual cooperates. Because each individual in the group
is assumed to cooperate, penalties can be ignored. These
curves represent the costs per cooperator and are valid for
any group size (e.g. n=2, n=10, n=135).
For inducement systems that make use of absolute
rewards and/or penalties (Figure 48), the costs per
individual are equal to the sum of the reward factor (r) and
the group incentive factor (g), costs=r+g. For those
inducement systems utilizing competitive rewards andjor
penalties (Figure 49), the costs depend only upon the group
incentive factor (g), costs=g. This result is due to the
fact that for inducement systems using competitive rewards,
the size of the reward is equal to zero when all individuals
cooperate, reward=r(l-c/n)=O when c=n.
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From these curves, the least cost inducement system for
each region of cooperation can be identified. For inducement
systems based on absolute rewards andjor penalties, the goal
is to find the inducement system with the minimum value of
r+g. For inducement systems based on competitive rewards
andjor penalties, the goal is to find the inducement system
with minimum value of g.
The cost curves shown in Figure 48 & 49 assume that
each individual cooperates. As discussed in the previous
section, for inducement systems based on competitive
rewards, there is a CIV region where the maximin criterion
leads to a mixed strategy over a portion of the region. As a
result, the level of cooperation predicted by game theory is
less than 1.0. Figure 50 shows the costs per cooperator
based on the level of cooperation (g/r) that results from
the mixed strategy. These cost curves are applicable to
inducement systems using competitive rewards when the1 values
of r and g are such that O<g<n and r>g.
The costs per cooperator for this region are calculated
as follows:
costs=[f(g(c/n)+r(1-c/n))+(1-f)g(cjn)]/(c/n)
costs=[g/r(g(g/r)+r(1-g/r))+(1-g/r)g(gjr)]/(g/r)
costs=g(g/r)+r-g+g-g(g/r)
costs=r
For this region, the only factor affecting the costs
per cooperator is the reward factor. Therefore, since the
minimum costs (r) and the maximum level of cooperation (g/r)
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both occur when r=g=l.O, this will be the preferred
inducement system from this region.
The cost curves developed above for the CIV region are
based on the concept of the mixed strategy. A different set
of cost curves might also be developed using the equilibrium
outcome to define the level of cooperation. This would
result in a slightly different set of cost curves. The mixed
strategy was chosen because of its close association with
game theory and the maximin criterion.
The cost curves shown in Figures 48-50 assume no change
in base pay. Organizations can adjust base pay in
conjunction with changes in incentives to control the
overall cost of inducements. While lowering base pay is
often difficult, most organizations can move to a higher
reward and group incentive factors by freezing cost-ofliving increases over a period of several years. However,
during periods of low inflation or financial emergency, it
may be necessary to lower base pay to meet targeted base pay
and incentive levels.
Implications for organizations. With the goal in mind
of achieving a high level of cooperation at a low cost, it
is possible to identify specific inducement systems of
interest to the organizational practitioner. These
inducement systems can be identified by using the cost
curves presented above to select the least cost inducement
system for each region of cooperation.
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As an example, consider the class of inducement systems
based on competitive rewards and penalties which is shown in
Figure 46. This class of inducement systems has two regions
(CI & CII) where cooperation is the natural outcome. The CII
region contains the least cost inducement system for this
class of inducement systems. These costs are minimum when
the group incentive factor (g) is zero and the reward factor
is greater than 10/9. In this case, the cost of gaining each
cooperator's added contributions would be 0.0 utiles.
The CI region is also of interest because of the fact
that Category I games have a Pareto optimal equilibrium,
while Category II games have a deficient equilibrium. The
least cost inducement system for this region occurs when the
values of r and g both approach one. The costs of this
inducement system would be 1.0 utiles.
The least cost inducement system for any region is the
inducement system(s) having the lowest cost of any
inducement system from the region. Finding the least cost
inducement system for regions where cooperation is the
natural outcome is an important starting point in choosing
an inducement system for use in an organization. Table VI
lists the costs per cooperator and design parameters for the
least cost inducement system for each region where
cooperation is the natural outcome for the six classes of
inducement systems being studied. The level of cooperation
for each of these regions is assumed to be 1.0. Note that
the level of cooperation for the least cost inducement
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system from the CIV region should also be 1.0, since cjn is
equal to gjr.
TABLE VI
LEAST COST INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MOTIVE
AND N-PERSON GROUPS
Class
Absolute
Rewards
Category I

r

0.5

g

cost

o.o

1.0

1.0

0.0

o.o

0.5

0.0

0.5

n
1.0

n

o.o

n
1.0

n
1.0

1.0
n/(n-1)

1.0

1.0

1.0

Penalties
Category
Both
Category I

p

Competitive
Rewards
category I
category IV

0.0
1.0

Penalties
category I
category III
Both
Category I
category II

1.0

1.0
nj(n-1)

o.o

1.0

o.o

Table VI summarizes the least cost inducement system
for the Individual motive. The most costly regions of
cooperation are the CI regions for inducement systems based
on competitive rewards or competitive penalties. The least
cost inducement systems in these regions have a cost of n
utiles, where n is the group size. For large groups, this
level of costs will likely be prohibitively high. The least
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costly inducement systems occur for the CI region based on
absolute penalties (p=1.0, g=O.O) and the CII region for
inducement systems based on competitive rewards and
penalties (r=n/(n-1), p=n/(n-1), g=O.O). These inducement
systems result in no additional costs over base salary.
The preceding analysis is based on what is rational for
individuals within the organization. What the analysis does
not indicate is how these outcomes compare with payoffs that
might be available outside the organization. As an example,
the least cost inducement system using absolute penalties
results in a payoff of -1.0 utiles to cooperators. Unless
the base pay is sufficiently high, individuals may be able
to improve their payoff by moving to another organization.
Even if individuals are unable or unwilling to move to
another organization, the perception that they are not being
compensated for their contributions can affect morale and
lead to other problems in the organization.
satisficing. As part of the work done in Phase I, an
additional analysis of the Individual motive was made based
on the theory of satisficing developed by Simon (1976). This
analysis provides answers to two questions. First, "Is the
outcome from cooperation satisfactory to the individual?".
The answer to this question is important, because an
individual may search for alternatives outside the
organization if no satisfactory outcomes are available
within the organization. The results of the analysis provide
information that can be used to resolve the problem of
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unsatisfactory outcomes noted above for inducement systems
based on absolute penalties.
Second,

11

Will a defecting individual receive a

satisfactory outcome? 11 • This question is critical, since if
a defector receives a satisfactory outcome, he may not
engage in the search behavior needed to discover whether
cooperation is preferable to defection. Such an individual
might continue to defect, even though the principles of
rationality would indicate that cooperation is the natural
outcome.
Figures 51 & 52 show the results of the satisficing
analysis of the· Individual motive for inducement systems
using competitive rewards and penalties. Results for the
other classes of inducement systems are shown in Appendix A.
This analysis makes use of the prior analysis of the natural
outcomes for the Individual motive. For regions where
cooperation is the natural outcome, the payoffs are reviewed
to answer the two questions listed above. First, a review is
made to see if cooperation results in a positive
(satisfactory) outcome. This review is made assuming that
all individuals are cooperators (c=n). Second, a review is
made to see if defectors receive a positive payoff for any
other level of cooperation (i.e. c=O to n-1).
Figure 51 shows the results of the satisficing analysis
for initial cooperators (n=10). The cross-hatched area
(light background, dark cross-hatching) shows where the
cooperation is the natural outcome and individuals receive a
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positive payoff from cooperation. This region (labeled
11

CSat. 11 ) has values of r, p and g such that g>l.O and

(r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-1). Examining Figure 51 shows that the CII
region ((r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-1) and g<l.O) results in an
unsatisfactory payoff to the individual, even though
cooperation is the natural outcome. Recall that for this
Category II region cooperation is individually rational but
collectively irrational. The designer of organizational
inducement systems should be sensitive to the problems that
may arise from selecting an inducement system where the
natural outcome results in an unsatisfactory payoff to the
individual.
Figure 52 shows the results of the satisficing analysis
for initial defectors. The cross-hatched area (dark
background, light cross-hatching) shows the region where
cooperation is the natural outcome and where defectors could
receive a positive outcome. This region (labeled

11

DSat. 11 )

has values of r, p and g such that (r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-1) and
(r+p)/2<g. As an example, consider the inducement system
with r=1.5, p=l.S, g=2.0, n=lO. The payoff for defection
(d=l) is 0.45 utiles when all others cooperate (c=9). This
payoff is positive, though it is less than the payoff for
cooperation (c=lO), 1.0 utiles. According to Simon's theory,
individuals receiving satisfactory outcomes may fail to act
in accordance with the accepted norms of rationality. If an
individual is currently a defector, he may continue to
defect even though the norms of rationality would predict
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cooperation. This outcome is of importance to organizational
practitioners. It illustrates how the presence of
satisfactory outcomes for defection can undermine the
effectiveness of an organization's inducement system.
Table VII summarizes the results from the satisficing
analysis based on initial cooperation and initial defection.
TABLE VII
SATISFICING REGIONS
FOR INITIAL COOPERATORS AND DEFECTORS
BASED ON N-PERSON GROUPS
Class
AbSOlute

Satisficing Regions
Initial
Cooperators

Initial
Defectors

Rewards

g>1.0
r+g/n>1.0

g>1.0
r+g/n>1.0

Penalties

g>1.0
p+g/n>1.0

p<g(n-1)/n
p+gjn>1.0

Both

(r+p)/2+g/n>1.0
r+p+g/n>1.0

(r+p)/2<g(n-1)/n
r+p+g/n>1.0

Rewards

g>1.0
r>g(n-g)/(n-1)

g>1.0
r>g(n-g)/(n-1)

Penalties

g>1.0
p>g(n-g)/(n-1)

g<p
p>g(n-g)/(n-1)

Both

g>1.0
(r+p)/2>g(n-g)/(n-1)

g<p
(r+p)/2>g(n-g)/(n-1)

competitive

The table shows the boundaries of the regions where
1) cooperators receive a positive payoff (c=n), and
2) defectors receive a positive payoff (d=1 to d=n). Results
are listed for all six classes of inducement systems. The
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analysis assumes no change in base pay. The regions would
change if changes in base pay were considered.
This analysis makes it possible to utilize two
additional criteria for selecting inducement systems.
Namely, that 1) inducement systems should result in a
satisfactory payoff for cooperators, and 2) inducement
systems should result in an unsatisfactory payoff for
defectors.
Of particular interest to organizational practitioners
is the least cost inducement system meeting the two
satisficing criteria. These two criteria are satisfied for
those inducement systems that fall within the csat. region
but which lie outside the DSat. region. As an example, the
region meeting the two satisficing criteria for inducement
systems using competitive rewards and penalties has values
of r and g such that g>1.0 and (r+p)/2>g. The least cost
inducement system for this region occurs when r=1.0, p=1.0
and g=1.0. The cost of this system would be 1.0 utiles. Note
that the cost of the least cost inducement system jumps from

o.o utiles to 1.0 utiles when these criteria are added to
the analysis of the Individual motive. Table VIII shows the
boundaries of the regions where cooperation is the natural
outcome and where the above two criteria are satisfied.
For inducement systems using competitive rewards only,
there is no region that meets the two satisficing criteria.
This is because defectors always receive a positive payoff
when there are no penalties and because the competitive
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TABLE VIII
REGIONS MEETING SATISFICING CRITERIA
FOR N-PERSON GROUPS
Class

Regions

Absolute
Rewards

r>1.0
g=1.0

Penalties

g>1.0
p>g(n-1)/n

Both

(r+p)/2+g>1.0
(r+p)/2>g(n-1)/n

Competitive
Rewards

none

Penalties

g>1.0
p>g

Both

g>1.0
(r+p)/2>g

reward is equal to o.o when each individual cooperates. For
inducement systems based on absolute rewards only, the
inducement systems meeting both criteria have g=O.o. When
g>O.O defectors receive a positive payoff. This problem can
be partially resolved by lowering base pay by g(n-1) utiles
and increasing the reward factor to 1+g(n-1)/n utiles.
Lowering base pay by g(n-1)/n utiles ensures that defectors
do not receive a positive payoff.
The results shown in Table VIII provide a useful
summary of the work done in Phase I. Based on the Individual
motive, six classes of inducement systems were investigated
to identify those regions where cooperation is the natural
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outcome. These regions were broken down into the four
categories of symmetric games and the least cost inducement
system identified for each region. These regions of interest
were further reduced by applying two additional criteria
based on the theory of satisficing.
Phase II Results
Phase I is based on the analysis of the Individual
motive. In phase II, five additional social motives are
considered 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism,
4) Equity, and 5) Aggression. Each of these motives is based
on the payoffs to others in comparison with payoffs to self
(see Table III and Figure 8).
The analysis of these social motives uses the same
methods used to analyze the Individual motive. For each
class of inducement systems, the payoff functions are
analyzed to determine whether cooperation or defection is
the natural outcome for the motive being considered. Regions
of cooperation and defection are further classified
according to the category of game which represents
inducement systems from those regions. A complete set of
results showing the natural outcomes and game categories for
the five social motives and the six classes of inducement
systems is shown in Appendix B.
Collective Motive. The Collective motive reflects a
preference for maximizing joint payoffs to the group. In
most cases, joint maximization follows from individual
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maximization. Regions with cooperation as the natural
outcome for the Individual motive also have cooperation as
the natural outcome for the Collective motive. The opposite
is also true; namely, that regions where defection is the
natural outcome for the Individual motive typically have
defection as the natural outcome for the Collective motive.
The only exception occurs for those regions that are
represented by category II games. These are the prisoner's
dilemma games where what is rational for the individual is
collectively irrational. Given the nature of these games, it
is not surprising that games that fall into Category II for
the Individual motive have the opposite natural outcome when
the Collective motive is considered.
Figure 53 shows the results for the Collective motive
and inducement systems based on competitive rewards and
penalties. When these results are compared with the results
for the Individual motive (see Figure 46), two changes are
apparent, 1) the DII region for the Individual motive
becomes part of the CI region for the Collective motive, and
2) the CII region for the Individual motive becomes part of
the DI region for the Collective motive.
While the regions where cooperation is the natural
outcome are similar for the Individual and Collective
motives, the game categories that result are not necessarily
the same. Regions that fall into Category I for the
Individual motive will also fall into Category I for the

162

10.0

Reward/
Penalty
Factor
r=p

5.0

1.0

0

0

Cooperate

1.0

5.0
Group Incentive Factor (g)

10.0

Natural Outcome
Dominating Strategy-- Pareto Equilibrium (Categozy I)
Dominating Strategy-- Deficient Equilibrium (Categozy II)

--

Defect

No Dominating Strategy-- Pareto Equilibrium (Categozy III) No Dominating Strategy- Non-equilbrium (Categozy IV)
Figure 53. Map of natural outcomes for the Collective motive
based on competitive rewards and penalties.

163

Collective motive. For other categories of games, no clear
correspondence exists.
One important result from the analysis of the
Collective motive is the difference that exist between the
Individual and Collective motives for Category II regions.
This is particularly true for the class of inducements based
on competitive rewards and penalties. While it is possible
to select a low cost inducement system with cooperation as
the natural outcome for the Individual motive (e.g. r=l.5,
p=l.5, g=O.O), this Category II inducement system will have
defection as the natural outcome for the collective motive.
Conversely, an inducement system from region DII for the
Individual motive would fall into region CI for the
Collective motive. In this case, a strong Collective motive
might lead to group cooperation, even though it is
irrational for the individual.
The CI region for the Collective motive occurs for all
six classes of inducement systems. This region does not
require the use of any individual incentives. If there is a
strong organizational culture that supports the Collective
motive, it may be possible to fashion a low cost inducement
system that results in a high level of organizational
cooperation. This type of inducement system can be fashioned
using group incentives only. Examples of this type of
inducement system occur in employee-owned companies, where
based pay is often supplemented by a major profit sharing
plan. While these companies often have no individual bonuses
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or merit pay, the strength of the Collective motive helps
these companies to operate using group rewards tied to the
overall performance of the company.
The use of group incentives only, may also make sense
in organizations where there is a high level of intrinsic
motivation or a critical need for cooperation between
individuals or work groups. Deci (1971) has questioned the
use of extrinsic rewards because of their adverse impact on
intrinsic motivation. The underlying theory is that the use
of extrinsic rewards shifts the locus of control from the
individual to his environment. If intrinsic motivation is
high, it may be preferable to use group incentives rather
than individual incentives. While group incentives may also
undermine intrinsic motivation, the fact that the choice is
tied to the Collective motive and not to the Individual
motive might reduce the shift in the locus of control away
from the individual. Similarly, if group incentives are used
exclusively, it may cause individuals to see their actions
as being based on maximizing collective payoffs rather than
payoffs to self. This could result in a general preference
for cooperation over individualistic or competitive
behaviors. More research is needed to understand the effects
of group (versus individual) incentives on the level of
intrinsic motivation and the individual's preferences for
social outcomes.
Competitive Motive. The competitive motive reflects a
preference for doing better than others. This is an
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important motive, particularly in the world of business.
While competition can be a positive force in motivating
individuals, it can also lead to dysfunctional behavior.
This can occur when an individual puts his own interests
ahead of those of the group.
For each of the six classes of inducement systems
studied, the combined area where cooperation is the natural
outcome for the Collective motive is slightly smaller than
the regions of cooperation for the Individual motive.
Figure 54 shows the results for the Competitive motive for
inducement systems based on absolute rewards. Comparing this
with the results for the Individual motive (see Figure 30)
shows that the region of cooperation has changed from
r+g/10>1.0 to r>l.O.
The differences between the Individual and Competitive
motives reflect the problem mentioned above. An individual
can improve his relative payoff by defecting, even though
cooperation is rational for both the Individual and
Collective motives. Figure 55 illustrates this problem for a
2-person inducement system using absolute rewards (r=0.75,
g=2.0). Defection is a dominating strategy for the
Competitive motive, while cooperation is a dominating
strategy for the Individual and Collective motives.
Designers of organizational inducement systems should be
cautious when using inducement systems that fall into this
region. Such inducement systems may cause dysfunctional
behavior due to the presence of the Competitive motive.
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One feature of the competitive motive that should be
noted is that the boundaries of regions do not depend on the
value of the group incentive factor (g). This result is
obvious, since group incentives apply to all parties equally
and, therefore, do not result in a change in the difference
between the payoffs to self and others. Because this motive
is based on differences between self and others, the size of
the group incentives does not affect the payoffs for this
motive.
From a design standpoint, cooperation is the natural
outcome for this motive for inducement systems based on
absolute rewards and/or penalties whenever (r+p)>1.0. For
inducement systems based on

competi~ive

rewards andjor

penalties, cooperation is the natural outcome whenever
(r+p)>2.0. Unless these minimum values of r+p are reached,
cooperation is never the natural outcome for this motive.
Conversely, cooperation is always the natural outcome of
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this motive when the value of r+p exceeds these minimum
values.
Altruism Motive. The Altruism motive is based on a
preference for maximizing the payoffs to others, without
consideration of the payoff to self. The rational basis for
this motive is that others will engage in reciprocal acts of
altruism (Trivers, 1964). While altruism based on kinship
relations is common in nature, there is a question about the
extent to which altruism operates in business organizations.
The importance of this motive in organizational settings is,
therefore, unknown.
The analysis of the Altruism motive for inducement
systems based on absolute rewards and/or penalties is
relatively straightforward. Cooperation is always the
natural outcome, since cooperation increases the payoff to
others whenever group incentive are used in conjunction with
absolute rewards and/or penalties. The DII region for the
Individual motive becomes a CI region for the Altruism
motive. The DI regions for the Individual motive become CII
regions for the Altruism motive. An interesting result
occurs for the CII region for the Altruism motive. For the
Individual motive, the corresponding region (r+p+g<1.0) has
defection as a dominating strategy and the equilibrium
outcome (d=10) is Pareto optimal (Category I). For the
Altruism motive, this region falls into Category II and
cooperation is the natural outcome. This is another example
of a prisoner's dilemma. The presence of the group incentive
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leads each individual to help the other group members, even
though this results in an inferior outcome for each
individual.
The analysis of the Altruism motive for inducement
systems based on competitive rewards andjor penalties is
somewhat more complex. For these inducement systems, the
choice to cooperate or defect influences the size of the
rewards and penalties.that others receive. For inducement
systems that use either competitive rewards or penalties,
the regions of cooperation includes those areas which have
cooperation as the natural outcome for the Individual motive
plus the DII region and a portion (r<g or p<g) of the DI
region for the Individual motive. The only regions which do
not have cooperation as the natural outcome for the Altruism
motive are 1) the region with r>g and g<l.O for inducement
systems based on competitive rewards, and 2) the region with
p>g and g<1.0 for inducement systems based on competitive
penalties.
A still more interesting result occurs for the class of
inducement systems based on competitive rewards and
penalties as shown is Figure 56. Comparing these results
with those for the Individual motive (see Figure 46) shows a
new region of defection (DII) with values of r, p and g such
that (r+p)/2>g and g>l.O. Defection is rational for this
region because the increases in the payoffs to others from
the high reward and penalty factors outweigh the increases
from group incentives that result from cooperation.
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The results from the Altruism motive show that while
this motive leads to cooperation as the natural outcome in
most cases, caution should be exercised when dealing with
competitive rewards andjor penalties. When the reward factor
is too high, individuals may engage in game playing (e.g.
working on someone else's behalf) or self-sacrifice (e.g.
defecting) based on a desire to increase the competitive
rewards to others.
Eguity Motive. The Equity motive is the social motive
which has received the most attention in the literature on
motivation. This motive is based on a preference for
minimizing the difference between the payoff to self and the
payoff to others. This motive differs from the other motives
in several aspects.
First, all of the regions that occur for this motive
fall within Category III. This is the only motive that has a
single category of games. Figure 57 shows the results for
inducement systems using absolute rewards.
Second, this motive always has at least two Pareto
equilibria. This is true because the best possible outcome
(no difference between self and other) occurs when either
all of the players cooperate (c=10) or all of the players
defect (d=10). This result is similar to the result
predicted by Equity theory with regard to High-High and
Low-Low outcomes (Adams, 1963).
Additionally, for inducement systems based on absolute
rewards and/or penalties and inducement systems using
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competitive rewards and penalties (r=p), the minimum payoffs
for cooperation and defection are also equal. Consider as an
example, the inducement system based on competitive rewards
and penalties shown in Figure 58. This figure shows the
payoffs for the Equity motive. Notice that the payoffs for
both equilibria (c=10 and d=10) are equal. As a result,
there is no basis for choosing between the two Pareto
optimal equilibria and there is no unique maximin outcome.
An individual with the Equity motive is, therefore,
indifferent to cooperation and defection as the natural
outcome for these classes of inducement systems. This result
is noted on Figure 57 (i.e. "Defect=Cooperate").
Category III games with two Pareto equilibria do not
occur in the taxonomy of Rappaport and Guyer (1966). Because
those authors use ordinal outcomes (Best>Second Best>Third
Best>Worst), two outcomes can never be equal to one another.
This is another example of where the game categories
developed by Rappaport and Guyer differ slightly from those
developed in this study.
Another interesting feature of these classes of
inducement systems is the equity line. The equity line
includes all inducement systems that result in equal payoffs
to cooperators and defectors for all levels of cooperation.
For these inducement systems the payoff curves for
cooperation and defection are identical. As a result,
individual receives their best possible outcome (Equity
motive) regardless of the level of cooperation.
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In this study, the comparison between self and others
used to formulate the Equity motive is based on the average
payoff to others. The group, as opposed to any specific
individual, is used as the referent for determining equity.
As such, the Equity motive leads to cooperation whenever the
majority of the group chooses to cooperate. However, when a
single individual is the referent, the group will adopt this
referent individual's level of contributions. In such cases,
equity might lead to defection even though it would not be
predicted on the basis of this analysis.
Aggression Motive. The Aggression motive reflects the
preference for outcomes that minimize the payoff to others.
This payoff is the opposite of the Altruism motive. Wherever
the Altruism motive has a natural outcome of cooperation,
the Aggression motive has a natural outcome of defection.
The game categories are also the same expect that Category
III games become Category IV games and category IV games
become Category III games.
As might be expected, the Aggression motive tends to
run counter to the other social motives. For inducement
systems based on absolute rewards and/or penalties, there is
no region where cooperation is the natural outcome for the
Aggression motive. For inducement systems based on
competitive rewards or penalties, the Aggression motive
generally leads to cooperation only when the other social
motives do not. However, for inducement systems based on
competitive rewards and penalties, there are two large
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regions (CI & CII) where cooperation is the natural outcome
and where the Individual motive and the Competitive motive
also have cooperation as the natural outcome. Figure 59
shows the results for the Aggression motive for inducement
systems based on competitive rewards and penalties. This
class of inducement systems may be of interest in
organizations desiring aggressive behavior by selected
employees. Competitive rewards are sometimes used in sales
organizations (O'Dell, 1987). Aggressive sales-related
behavior may be beneficial in these organizations, since
there is often a limited need for cooperation between
individual sales representatives. In general, however, the
Aggression motive runs counter to the organization's need
for coordinated actions and common goals. As such, most
organizations will prefer to select inducement systems where
the Altruism motive (versus Aggression motive) has
cooperation as the natural outcome.
Implications for Organizations. The results of phases
I & II define the regions where cooperation is the natural
outcome for the Individual motive and the five social
motives. In an empirical study by McClintock, Messick,
Kuhlman and Campos (1974) the frequency of cooperation was
found to increase as the number of social motives satisfied
by cooperation increased. Their work considered four
motives: 1) Individual, 2) Collective, 3) Competitive, and
4) Aggression. The fact that behavior was influenced by the
degree to which social motives were satisfied has important
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implications for organizations. Namely, that inducement
systems should be selected that have cooperation as the
natural outcome for as many motives as possible.
One way to apply the results of phases I & II is to map
the regions where cooperation is the natural outcome for
each of the motives being considered. Figures 60 thru 65 are
summary maps showing the overlapping regions of cooperation
for the Individual motive and the five social motives. These
figures can be used to select inducement systems from
regions where cooperation is the natural outcome for several
motives. These inducement systems can be expected to result
in cooperation over the widest range of social motives. This
should lead to an increased level of cooperation when
compared with regions where fewer motives have cooperation
as the natural outcome.
The regions shown in Figures 60-65 do not differentiate
between game categories. Because some game categories are
preferable to others (e.g. Category I), it is important to
look at the actual game categories for each social motive
before selecting an inducement system. As an example, an
organizational practitioner might want to select an
inducement system from a CI region for the Individual motive
to ensure that cooperation is as stable as possible for this
important motive.
To illustrate the use of these figures, consider the
results shown in Figure 60 for inducement systems using
absolute rewards. When the value of the reward factor is
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greater than 1.0, four motives (Individual, Collective,
Competitive and Altruism) have cooperation as the natural
outcome. Recall that neither cooperation or defection can be
the natural outcome for the Equity motive for this class of
inducement systems, and that the Altruism and Aggression
motives can not both have cooperation as the natural
outcome. As a result, the region with r>1.0 has cooperation
as the natural outcome for the maximum number of social
motives. Since altruism is likely to be preferred over
aggression in an organization, this region is probably
optimal for this class of inducement systems.
A number of real-world inducement systems are based on
absolute rewards. Sales commissions or piece rates are
examples of absolute reward systems. Provided that the size
of the reward is sufficient to compensate for the added
effort, these inducement systems should be effective for the
Individual, Collective, Competitive and Altruism motives.
Another application of the results of phase II is in
aligning the inducement system with the business strategy or
culture of the organization. Lawler (1983), in particular,
has argued for designing inducement systems based on the
goals of the organization. Consider, as an example, a
business that wants an aggressive and competitive sales
force for gaining market share in a new area. Reviewing
Figure 65 shows that for the class of inducement systems
based on competitive rewards and penalties, there is a
region (g<1.0, r>(10-g)/9) where cooperation is the natural
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outcome for the Individual, Competitive, and Aggression
motives. An inducement system from this region has the
potential for rewarding and reinforcing the behaviors that
the business wishes to see in its sales force. This result
is consistent with the finding that outside sales
organizations often make use of special cash incentive and
noncash incentive and recognition programs based on
competition (Colletti, 1988).
Another organization may require a high degree of
cooperation and an absence of internal competition to
succeed. such an organization might chose to use group
incentives alone in or in combination with a low level of
rewards and/or penalties to form an inducement system that
results in cooperation for the Collective and Altruism
motives. One such region is shown in Figure 63 (l.O<g<10.0,
r<(lO-g)/9) for inducement systems based on competitive
rewards. This type of inducement system could be formed
using a special cash incentive program for exceptional
performance in combination with a gainsharing plan. This
combination of incentives might be acceptable even in a
unionized setting, where it is normally difficult to have
any significant amount of employee compensation tied to
individual performance.
The results from phases I and II should be viewed as a
starting point in the selection of an inducement system for
a real-world organization. The results are valuable from a
heuristic standpoint in identifying the classes of
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inducement systems that should be examined in greater
detail. Of course, many other factors need to be considered
before selecting an inducement system for real-world
application (e.g. external job market, administration,
senior management approval, degree of unionization, employee
attitudes, etc.)
Phase III Results
The analysis performed in phases I and II is a static
analysis. The natural outcomes that are given are based on
the analysis of a single motive. Phase III extends the
analysis by considering how the populations or frequencies
of the six motives might evolve and how this evolution would
affect the overall level of cooperation.
An analysis of the evolution of social motives requires

that specific inducement systems be selected for modeling.
The results of phases I and II were used to select the
inducement systems to be modeled. These inducement systems
were chosen based on costs and the number of social motives
with cooperation as the natural outcome. Table IX shows the
inducement systems selected for modelling, the motives that
had cooperation as the natural outcome and the costs of the
inducement system.
Fitness versus satisfaction. Two models were developed
for studying the evolution of social motives. One model
takes the view that social motives evolve based on their
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success in gaining material payoffs that increase the
fitness of the individual. These are the payoffs which are
TABLE IX
INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS SELECTED
FOR MODELING IN PHASE III

r

Class
p

Motives

Costs
(utiles)

g

Absolute
1.5
0
0.5
0
1.25
0

0
1.0
0.25

1,2,3,4
2,4
1,2,3,4

0.0
1.5
1.5

Comgetitive
2.5
0
2.5
0
1.25
1.25
0
2.5
2.5
0
1.25
1.25
1.5
0
1.5
0
0.75
0.75
0
2.5
0
2.5
1.25
1.25
2.5
2.5

0
0
0
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5

3,6
3,5,6
1,3,6
3,6
3,5,6
1,3,6
1,2,4,5
1,2,4
2,4
1,2,3,4
1 thru 5
1,2,3,4
1,2,3,6

0.0

none
4
2,4

0.0
0.5
1.5

Groug Incentives Onl~
0
0
0
0
0
0.5
0
0
1.5

o.o

0.0
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5

!)Individual, 2) Collective, 3) Competitive, 4)
Altruism, 5) Equity, 6) Aggression
reflected in the Individual motive. This model is labeled
the "Fitness" model.
The second model treats the outcome preferences
reflected by the motive as ends in themselves. The success
of a motive is viewed in terms of its ability to gain
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payoffs that satisfy the preferences of the motive.
Preferences are assumed to be satisfied when the best
possible (maximum available) outcome is achieved. Satisfying
this preference is considered to be intrinsically rewarding.
This model is labeled the "Satisfaction" model.
These models reflect two alternative explanations of
how learning occurs within an organizational setting. The
first model reflects the traditional approach of
evolutionary game theory. The second is an attempt to
fashion an alternative model that breaks from the normal
assumptions of game theory, that individuals act to maximize
their self-interests. The purpose of this portion of the
study is to explore a new form of analysis made possible by
the use of game theory. These models and their results
should be viewed as a speculative attempt to widen our
conceptual knowledge of motivation.
Results of Modeling. The two models (Fitness and
Satisfaction) were used to analyze each of the inducement
systems shown in Table IX. All of the analysis in phase III
was made using a 10-person group. The initial frequencies
(f) of each social motive were set equal (f=0.167) and the
simulation models were run until the equilibrium frequency
for each social motive was reached. The results from the
simulations were plotted to show the evolution of the
frequencies of the social motives and the level of
cooperation. These graphs were prepared for each of the
inducement systems shown in Table IX and are included in
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Appendix

c. The results from this phase of analysis are

quite diverse. While it is not possible to review the
results for each inducement system in detail, general
observations can be made regarding the results for the
various classes of inducement systems.
It is useful to begin with the three inducement systems
based on group incentives only. As discussed earlier, these
inducement systems are the limiting case (r=O, p=O) for the
other classes of inducement systems. When the group
incentive factor is also equal to zero, we have the base
case inducement system. The only compensation to the
individual is that which comes from base pay. This motive
does not have cooperation as the natural outcome for any of
the six social motives. For both the Fitness model and the
Satisfaction model, the level of cooperation is zero
throughout the simulation. Note that the frequencies of the
motives change in the Satisfaction mode, but not in the
Fitness model. In the Fitness model, the payoffs for the
Individual motive are used to adjust the frequencies of all
six motives. Because each motive defects, each motive
receives the same payoff and the frequencies are unchanged
from round to round. For the Satisfaction model, each motive
uses the payoffs from its own motive (see Table III) to
define its satisfaction relative to the other social motives
(i.e. (PC(i)-Pmax(i))/(Pmax(i)-Pmin(i))). Since the degree
of satisfaction is different for each motive, the
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frequencies evolve from round to round even though each
motive defects.
The other two inducement systems using group incentives
are somewhat more interesting. While neither of these
inducement systems result in cooperation for the Fitness
model, the inducement system with g=0.5 does result in a
partial level of cooperation (cjn=0.28) for the Satisfaction
model. The results for the Satisfaction model (r=O.o, p=o.o,
g=0.5) are shown in Figure 66. Note that the Individual and
Altruism motives displace the other motives, even though one
motive cooperates and the other motive defects. The steadystate level of cooperation is based on cooperation by the
Altruism motive. The reason that this motive cooperates is
that cooperation increases the payoff to others. The same
rationale does not lead to cooperation, however, when the
group incentive factor is increased to 1.5. The reason for
this apparently contradictory result is that the payoff for
altruism becomes relatively less satisfying than the payoff
for aggression when g is increased to 1.5. As a result, the
Aggression motive displaces the Altruism motive for this
inducement system.
Three inducement systems using absolute rewards and
penalties were also considered. Only three inducement
systems were considered because the results for any two
inducement systems are equivalent when the value of g and
the sum of r and p are equal (e.g. r=O.O, p=1.5, g=0.5 is
equivalent to r=1.25, p=0.25, g=0.5). Two of the inducement

-.
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systems have cooperation as the natural outcome for the
Individual, Collective, Competitive and Altruism motives.
For these inducement systems, both the Fitness and
Satisfaction models lead to total cooperation (c/n=1.0) as
the steady-state outcome.
A number of inducement systems based on competitive
rewards andjor penalties were modeled. The four inducement
systems using competitive rewards each resulted in an
intermediate level of cooperation for both the Fitness model
and the Satisfaction model. For the Fitness model, the
steady-state level of cooperation was reached when
cjn=l-1/r. This is the point where the payoffs for
cooperation and defection are equal. When the simulation
reaches this point, no further evolution of motives occurs.
How quickly the model evolves to this point determines what
motives remain. Figure 67 shows the results for r=2.5,
p=O.O, g=0.5. Note how the level of cooperation fluctuates
before settling down at the equilibrium frequencies. For the
inducement system with r=2.5, p=o.o, g=1.5, the dynamics of
the system are such that no steady-state was reached, even
though several hundred rounds were eventually ran.
For the Satisfaction model, the steady-state outcome
for three of the four inducement systems based on
competitive rewards and penalties involved a cycle between
two levels of cooperation. Figure 68 shows the results for
the Satisfaction model and an inducement system based on
competitive rewards (r=2.5, p=O.O, g=O.O). For this
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inducement system, the level of cooperation jumps between

o.o and 0.5 in successive rounds. The motive associated with
this cyclic behavior is the Altruism motive. When the level
of cooperation is low (cjn=O.O), the altruist increases the
payoff the others by cooperating. When the level of
cooperation is higher (cjn=0.5), the altruist improves the
payoff to others by defecting. This cyclic behavior is
unlikely in a real organization, since it is improbable that
the actions of a large portion of the group would be
synchronized.
Four inducement systems using competitive penalties
were also analyzed. For these inducement systems, the
steady-state levels of cooperation were found to vary
depending upon the starting levels of cooperation. Recall
that the payoffs for cooperation and defection for the
Individual motive are equal when cjn=1/p. When the level of
cooperation is less than 1/p, then the payoffs for defection
are greater than the payoffs for cooperation. This causes
the frequencies of defecting motives to increase and
ultimately results in complete defection (cjn=O.O) as the
steady-state outcome. The converse occurs when the level of
cooperation is greater than 1/p. The frequencies of motives
that cooperate increase and the steady-state outcome is
total cooperation (c/n=1.0).
Figures 69 & 70 show the results for the Fitness model
when r=O.O, p=1.5, g=1.5. Figure 69 has an initial level of
cooperation of cjn=0.5, based on the natural outcomes for
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the six social motives. In Figure 70, the initial level of
cooperation was increased to 0.83 by making two additional
motives first round cooperators. These motive would normally
begin as defectors, since they have defection as the natural
outcome. Observe how the change in the initial level of
cooperation affects the steady-state level of cooperation.
The use of the natural outcome to define the initial level
of cooperation follows from the analysis done in phases I
and II. Organizational practitioners should be sensitive to
the fact that the success of a particular inducement system
might depend on the starting level of cooperation in the
organization. When the existing level of cooperation is low,
it may not be practical to use competitive penalties to
increase contributions.
Five inducement systems using competitive rewards and
penalties were modeled. Each of these inducement systems had
cooperation (c=10) as the steady-state outcome for the
Fitness model. All but one of the inducement systems also
had cooperation as the steady-state outcome for the
Satisfaction model. Figures 71 & 72 show the results for an
inducement system using competitive rewards and penalties
(r=2.5, p=2.5, g=1.5). Figure 71 is based on the Fitness
model and Figure 72 on the satisfaction model. This
inducement system is from a region where cooperation is the
natural outcome for the Individual, Collective, Competitive
and Aggression motives. Note that the Altruism motive has
defection as the natural outcome for this region.
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In Figure 71 (Fitness model), the level of cooperation
quickly rises to 1.0. As discussed earlier (phase II), the
high reward and penalty factors of this inducement system
lead the Altruism motive to defect so that others will
receive these rewards. This causes the frequency of this
motive to rapidly diminish as the penalties decrease its
payoffs. By contrast, the Equity motive immediately begins
to mimic the behavior of the other motives in order to
minimize the difference between its payoff and the payoffs
others. This is an example of the tendency of this motive to
follow the group norm.
In Figure 72 (Satisfaction model), the level of
cooperation initially fluctuates and then returns to its
starting level of 0.667. In the process, the frequency of
the Altruism motive jumps to f=0.33. over an extended period
of time, the increased level of satisfaction for the
Individual, Equity and Altruism motives displace the other
motives entirely. In this example, the Equity and Altruism
motives both succeed in establishing themselves in the final
equilibrium populations. The fact that one defects while the
other cooperates results in a partial level of cooperation
as the steady-state outcome. Similar results occur whenever
the reward and penalty factors exceed the group incentive
factors. When this happens, the Altruism motive has
defection as the natural outcome and this results in less
than total cooperation as the steady-state outcome. As a
result, it may be inadvisable to use competitive rewards and

r---
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penalties unless the group incentive factor is equal to or
larger than the reward (andjor penalty) factor.
Implications to organizations. The inducement systems
analyzed in phase III show how the two models of
organizational learning (Fitness and Satisfaction) can lead
to different predictions about the stability of social
motives. One way in which this study is useful is in
identifying inducement systems where both models predict a
high (or acceptable) level of cooperation as the steadystate. This is an additional criteria which can be used when
selecting an inducement system. Inducement systems which
lead to high levels of cooperation for both learning models
should be more successful in gaining the cooperation of
individuals within an organization. Table X shows the
steady-state levels of cooperation for the Fitness model and
the Satisfaction model for each of the inducement systems
being studied. The most desirable inducement systems are
those where the steady-state level of cooperation results in
total cooperation (c/n=l.O) for both models. As an example,
for inducement systems based on absolute rewards and/or
penalties, the inducement system with r=O.O, p=l.5 and g=O.O
is preferred over the inducement system with r=0.5, p=O.O
and g=l.O, since only the former has steady-state values of
c;n equal to 1.0 for both models.
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TABLE X
EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF COOPERATION
FOR FITNESS AND SATISFACTION MODELS
Class
p

r

g

F;!tness
(c/n)

Satisfaction
(c/n)

Absolute
0
0.5
1.25

1.5
0
0

0
1.0
0.25

1.0
0.0
1.0

1.0

0
0
0
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5

0.6
0.0
1.0
0.6
1.0
1.0
0.33
0.0
0.0

0.25
1.0
1.0
0.33
1.0
1.0
0.75
0.0
0.0
0.45
1.0
1.0
0.68

o.o

1.0

Com~etitive

2.5
0
1.25
2.5
0
1.25
1.5
0
0.75
2.5
0
1.25
2.5
Grou~

0
0
0

0
2.5
1.25
0
2.5
1.25
0
1.5
0.75
0
2.5
1.25
2.5

1.0
1.0
1.0

Incentives Only
0
0
0

0
0.5
1.5

0.0

o.o

0.0

0.0
0.28
0.0

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarizes the practical implications and
theoretical significance of the results and methods and
provides recommendations regarding further empirical and
theoretical work. The results from the preceding analysis
(see Chapter IV) are used to develop criteria for selecting
inducement systems which should be effective in motivating
individuals to make discretionary contributions towards the
goals of the organization. Inducement systems meeting these
criteria are identified for each of the six classes of
inducement systems being studied. The most efficient
inducement systems from these regions are identified based
on the costs of the inducement system to the organization.
Suggestions are made for applying the results to real-world
organizations. The limitations of the study are discussed
and suggestions are given for future empirical and
analytical work.
This chapter also discusses the theoretical
significance of the application of game theory to the study
of inducement systems and social motives. The relationship
of this work to expectancy theory and other theories based
on social motives is presented and recommendations are given
regarding further work needed to build an integrated theory
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of motivation - one capable of incorporating a range of
social motives.
Inducement System Design
Organizations are concerned with designing inducement
systems which are both effective and efficient (Barnard,
1938). Inducement systems are effective when they motivate
individuals to contribute their efforts towards the goals of
the organization. Inducement systems are efficient when they
use a minimum of organizational resources.
The results of the three phases of analysis given in
Chapter IV can be used as selection criteria for

design~ng

inducement systems which motivate individuals to contribute
to the organization. Many inducement systems will not meet
all of these criteria. Those that do meet these criteria
should be good candidates for consideration by
organizational practitioners. They should not be used
blindly, however. Inducement systems that meet all of the
criteria may not fit a given organization, while other
inducement systems might work very well. As noted by Lawler
(1983), inducement systems should be designed so that they
are congruent with the organization's structure, management
philosophy, and decision making and communications styles.
The first phase of analysis was based on the Individual
motive and the belief that individuals will seek to maximize
their self-interest. Self-interest is one of the core
assumptions of most theories of motivation. The importance

~-
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of the Individual motive leads to a selection criterion that
requires inducement systems to have cooperation as the
natural outcome for the Individual motive. The results from
phase I give the regions where cooperation is the natural
outcome for the six classes of inducement systems being
considered. These results are summarized in Table V (see
Chapter IV) and shown graphically in Appendix A. Inducement
systems from these regions meet the criterion being
discussed - that cooperation is the natural outcome for the
Individual motive.
Two additional criteria from phase I can also be used
to screen inducement systems. These are the satisficing
criteria that: 1) cooperators receive satisfactory outcomes,
and 2) defectors receive unsatisfactory outcomes. When these
criteria are met, satisficing behavior (Simon, 1976) should
not interfere with the natural outcome. The regions where
these two criteria are met depend upon the level at which
base pay is set. As such, organizational practitioners
should be open to modifying base pay to meet these
satisficing criteria. Table VIII shows the regions where
both satisficing criteria are met, assuming no change in
base pay. These regions are graphically depicted in
Appendix A.
In phase II, five additional social motives were
considered: 1) Collective, 2) Competitive, 3) Altruism,
4) Equity, and 5) Aggression. While the business goals of an
organization may dictate a preference for some motives over
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others (e.g. Collective vs. Competitive) in shaping the

.

culture of the organization, most organizations would prefer
an inducement system that promotes cooperation across as
many social motives as possible. The general exception is
the Aggression motive, which can be dysfunctional in many
organizations. This is partly because a motive based on
minimizing the payoffs to others is likely to have negative
impacts that effect other areas of the business (e.g.
customer relations, interpersonal communications, teamorientation). Additionally, inducement systems that have
cooperation as the natural outcome for the Aggression motive
typically have defection as the natural outcome for the
other motives.
Given the potential problems with the Aggression
motive, an appropriate criterion for selecting inducement
systems is the number of social motives (excluding
Aggression) that have cooperation as the natural outcome.
Figures 60-65 summarize the natural outcomes for the social
motives for the six classes of inducement systems being
considered (see Chapter IV). These figures present the major
results from phase II of the analysis. Other factors being
equal, inducement systems from regions where cooperation is
the natural outcome for the largest number of motives
(excluding Aggression) are preferred.
In phase III, selected inducement systems were analyzed
to determine the possible evolution of social motives. Two
learning models were used to model candidate inducement
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systems. One model (Fitness Model) interprets social motives
as strategies for maximizing material payoffs. The other
(Satisfaction Model) treats social motives as reflecting
genuine preferences for social motives. Where both models
lead to cooperation as the steady-state outcome, this
outcome can be thought of as robust (i.e. a high level of
cooperation would continue over many payoffs). The criterion
that both models evolve to cooperation as the steady-state
outcome is the final effectiveness criterion used in this
study. A summary of the results from phase III for selected
inducement systems are shown in Table X (see Chapter IV).
Each of the three phases of analysis provide possible
selection criteria for choosing an organizational inducement
system. These criteria are concerned with the potential
effectiveness of inducement systems in gaining the
cooperation of individuals with the goals of the
organization. Each of these criteria can be used to screen
inducement systems based on the ability of the inducement
system to promote individual cooperation with the goals of
the organization. The effectiveness criteria that were
developed from each phase of the analysis are summarized in
Table XI. Inducement systems that meet each of these
criteria have the potential to be effective in promoting
individual cooperation with the goals of the organization.
While primarily concerned with the issue of
effectiveness, this study also examines the issue of
efficiency. Efficiency is viewed in terms of the costs of
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the inducement system to the organization. From the
perspective of the organization, an inducement system is
efficient if it promotes cooperation at the lowest cost to
the organization. Cost curves for each of the classes of
TABLE XI
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CRITERIA
FOR SELECTING ORGANIZATIONAL INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS
Phase I
Inducement systems should have cooperation as the
natural outcome for the Individual motive.
The payoffs to cooperators for the Individual
motive should be satisfactory when every
individual cooperates.
The payoffs to defectors for the Individual motive
should be unsatisfactory for all levels of
cooperation by others.
Phase II
Inducement systems are preferred which have
cooperation as the natural outcome for the largest
number of social motives (excluding the Aggression
motive).
Phase III
Inducement systems should evolve to total
cooperation as the steady-state outcome for both
the Fitness and Satisfaction models.
inducement system were developed earlier and are shown in
Figures 48-50 (see Chapter IV). These cost curves can be
used to find the least cost inducement system meeting the
effectiveness criteria shown in Table XI. The inducement
system meeting each of the effectiveness criteria and having
the lowest cost should be of interest to organizations.
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The least cost inducement system is, of course, not
necessarily the best inducement system. The methods used in
this study depend on an accurate measure of the costs that
the individual assigns to their discretionary contributions
and the utility of various inducements to the individual.
Additionally, this study makes no allowances for differences
among individuals. As a result, the organization is faced
with significant uncertainties when setting the optimum
values of the group and individual incentive factors.
Organizations may, therefore, wish to select inducement
systems with somewhat higher costs to ensure the cooperation
of the majority of individuals in the face of these
uncertainties.
The cost curves given in Figure 48 & 49 represent the
costs of incentives given by the organization to
cooperators. The units are based on the utility of those
incentives to the cooperating individuals. In determining
the costs that the organization is willing to pay to gain
the cooperation of individuals, the organization must
determine 1) the value of the discretionary contributions
these incentives gain, and 2) the ability of the
organization to pay those incentives. Organizations may be
willing to pay a great deal for highly valued or scarce
contributions. On the other hand, the organization may look
to restructure its inducement systems to lower costs during
times of financial emergency. These decisions depend on the
specific conditions facing the organization.
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The effectiveness and efficiency criteria described
above can be applied to each of the six classes of
inducement systems to select candidate inducement systems
for use in an organization. Table XII summarizes the
recommendations of this study regarding the selection of
organizational inducement systems. This table indicates
1) the regions where each of the effectiveness criteria are
met, 2) the parameters of the least cost inducement system,
and 3) the costs of the least cost inducement system. The
results for each class of inducement systems are discussed
below.
Absolute Rewards. For inducement systems based on
absolute rewards, the only inducement systems where each of
the selection criteria is satisfied occur when the values of
the reward factor (r) and the group incentive factor (g) are
r>1.0 and g=O.O (assuming no change in base pay). When g>O.O
this class of inducement systems fails to meet the
satisficing criteria which requires that defectors receive
an unsatisfactory payoff. Fortunately, there is a relatively
simple solution to this problem. By reducing base pay by
g utiles, defectors will always receive an unsatisfactory
payoff. The value of the reward factor (r) can then be
adjusted to ensure that cooperators always receive a
satisfactory payoff. This value is determined as follows:
C(n)=g(n/n)+r-1-g>O.O
r>1
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TABLE XII
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SELECTING INDUCEMENT SYSTEMS
BASED ON EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY CRITERIA
Class

Effectiveness
r

Efficiency:
p
g

Cost

Absolute
1.0
0.0
r>1.0
g=O.O
or
1.0
g
g>O.O
(assuming base pay is lowered by g utiles)

Rewards

1.0
1.0

Penalties

p>1.0
g>1.0
p>g(n-1)/n

1.0

0.0

1.0

Both

1.0
(r+p)>1.0
r+g>1.0
or 0.5
(r+p)/2>g(n-1)/n

1.0
0.5

0.0
0.5

1.0
1.0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

Competitive
Rewards

none

Penalties

p>2.0
g>1.0
p>g

Both

(r+p)/2=g
g>1.0

1.0

p=penalty factor
r=rewards factor
n=group size
g=group incentive factor
Figure 73 shows the regions where the effectiveness
criteria are met for inducement systems based on absolute
rewards. The cross-hatched area (r>1.0) includes systems
meeting each of effectiveness criterion listed in Table XI.
These results are based on reducing base pay by g utiles.
Inducement systems based on absolute rewards fall into this
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(assuming base pay is reduced by g utiles).
Figure 73. Map of the tegion meeting effectiveness criteria fot
absolute rewards.
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region when r>1.0. When this condition is met four social
motives have cooperation as the natural outcome, 1)
Individual, 2) Collective, 3) Competitive, and 4) Altruism.
Recall that the Equity motive has no unique solution for the
natural outcome for this class for inducement systems.
However, when r=1.0 the inducement system falls on the
equity line and payoffs will be equitable for all levels of
cooperation. Also note that cooperators always receive a
satisfactory outcome when r>1.0.
The two inducement systems from this region which were
analyzed in phase III resulted in cooperation (cjn=1.0) as
the steady-state outcome for both the Fitness and the
Satisfaction models. These two inducement systems had design
parameters of p=1.5, g=O.O and r=1.25, g=0.25. As discussed
in Chapter IV, the inducement system with p=1.5, g=O.O is
equivalent to an inducement system with r=1.5, g=O.O for
inducement systems based on absolute rewards andjor
penalties.
Two types of absolute rewards used in organizations are
sales commissions and piece rates. These incentives can be
used with or without group incentives. A recent survey of
sales and marketing organizations found that 65% of
organizations with outside sales personnel used sales
commissions to reward individuals (O'Dell, 1987). The median
reward was 25% of base compensation. Incentive pay has also
been used successfully in manufacturing businesses. Lincoln
Electric has paid its employees on a piecework basis for
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decades (Perry, 1988). In addition employees receive a
year-end bonus based on their dependability, quality and
output. Employee bonuses average 97.6% of regular earnings
and Lincoln has not had a losing quarter in 54 years.
Commissions and piece rates benefit from the fact that
they both have objective and measurable outputs. Because
commissions and piece rates are generally set in advance,
individuals have a high degree of certainty that their
performance will result in known outcomes. This results in
clearly defined goals and high performance-outcome
expectancies (P-->0).
Another common form of individual rewards is merit pay.
In many organizations, employees receive merit increases
based on meeting established goals and objectives. These
goals and objectives are often tailored to the specific
tasks and responsibilities of the individual and can include
both objective and subjective measures. A problem with merit
pay incentive systems is that merit pay tends to become
viewed as a part of base compensation. As a result, pay is
rarely reduced, even when performance falls. Employees often
receive annual merit increases until they reach the top of
their salary range. "Topping out", as it is known, leads to
morale and motivation problems for long-term employees in a
given pay classification.
Lawler (1983) has recommended that organizations
consider using lump sum merit increases to help preserve the
effectiveness of incentive rewards. Lump sum merit increases
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reward individuals based on their individual performance.
Unlike most merit pay systems, these rewards do not add to
the individual's base pay but are paid as a separate bonus.
By requiring that individuals earn their bonus each
performance period, lump sum merit increases help preserve
the effectiveness of the reward.
If base pay is not reduced, the addition of group
incentives increases the cost of the inducement system over
the least cost inducement system. However, when no group
incentives are used, individuals are indifferent between
defection and cooperation for the Altruism motive. As a
result, individuals may be more likely to sacrifice group
interests for individual interests. Organizations using
absolute rewards may wish to include group incentives in
order to reinforce cooperation by this motive. This can be
done without increasing costs if base pay is reduced by g
utiles. One of the gainsharing type group incentives could
be effective for this purpose (e.g. Rucker, Improshare,
Scanlon). The use of group incentives would also increase
the salience of the Collective motive. When group incentives
are built around an employee participation process, they can
be very effective in promoting teamwork and cooperation
(Doyle, 1983).
Absolute Penalties. The region where each of the
selection criteria are satisfied for inducement systems
using absolute penalties has values of p and g such that
p>1.0, p>g(n-1)/n and g>1.0 (see Table XII). The penalty
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factor must be greater than 1.0 to ensure cooperation by the
Individual, Collective, Competitive and Altruism motives.
The penalty factor must also be greater than g(n-1)/n to
ensure that defectors receive an unsatisfactory payoff.
Because there are no rewards for cooperation, the group
incentive factor must be greater than 1.0 to ensure that the
natural outcome results in a satisfactory payoff for
cooperators.
Figure 74 shows the region where the effectiveness
criteria are met for inducement systems based on absolute
penalties. The higher group factor (g>1.0) for this class of
inducement systems causes the least cost inducement system
to have the same costs per cooperator that were found for
inducement systems using absolute rewards. In general, the
minimum cost per cooperator must be at least 1.0 utiles to
offset the costs to the individual from cooperating.
Inducement systems meeting the above criteria have
cooperation as the natural outcome for the Individual,
Collective, Competitive and Altruism motives. The higher
level of group incentives needed for this class of
inducement systems should be beneficial to organizations
trying to promote the Collective and Altruism motives. Note
that the high penalty factors would also act to eliminate
defectors from the organization due to the unsatisfactory
outcomes that they would receive.
One important observation about this class on
inducement systems is that unless the group incentive factor

~--
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is greater than one (g>l.O), cooperators will be
dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction might affect overall
performance, even though the individual cooperates with
respect to the parameter used to measure contributions.
Another difficulty with the use of penalties is that
many supervisors are unable to use them effectively.
Confronting an employee and taking away compensation is a
difficult supervisory task. Too little attention has been
given to the communication, interpersonal and psycho-social
skills needed to effectively implement various inducement
systems, particularly those involving penalties. The use of
any monetary penalties (absolute or competitive) should only
be considered if their use is consistent with the level of
training and skills of supervisors.
The problems associated with lowering pay may lead some
organizations to consider using noncash penalties. For
example, posting production or sales records or using a
progressive discipline procedure are penalties that could be
used in lieu of monetary penalties. These types of
incentives might be particularly effective in eliminating
low performers from the organization while preserving a
major portion of total compensation for group incentives.
Absolute Rewards and Penalties. The region of interest
for inducement systems using absolute rewards and penalties
has values of r, p and g such that (r+p)>l.O,
(r+p)/2>g(n-1)/n and (r+p)/2+g>l.O (see Table XII). This
region is shown in Figure 75. A number of least cost
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inducement systems can be selected from this region. This is
because inducement systems along the boundary where
(r+p)/2+g=l.O all have costs of 1.0 utiles per cooperator.
The practitioner can, therefore, choose whether or not to
include group incentives without increasing the costs to the
organization. As an example, the inducement systems r=l.O,
p=l.O, g=O.O and r=0.5, p=0.5, g=0.5 each have a cost of
1.0 utiles.
Organizations should give consideration to basing their
inducement systems on absolute rewards and penalties. This
class of inducement systems has many of the best features on
inducement systems based on absolute rewards or penalties.
As an example, lump sum merit increases could be combined
with noncash penalty systems (e.g. discipline) and a
gainsharing program. This type of inducement system would
encourage defectors to improve their performance or leave
the organization while providing strong motivation for
individual and group performance.
Competitive Rewards. Inducement systems using
competitive rewards have no region where each of the
selection criteria are met. This result occurs because there
are no penalties to defectors and because there are no
rewards to cooperators when each individual cooperates. For
inducement systems using absolute rewards, this problem was
corrected by decreasing base pay by g(n-1)/n utiles. Because
there are no competitive rewards when each individual
cooperates (i.e. reward=r(1-cjn)=O), a positive payoff for
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cooperators can only be achieved by increasing the group
incentive such that g>l.O. For this category of games, it is
impossible to meet both of the satisficing criteria, since g
must be greater than 1.0 (g>l.O) for cooperators to receive
a satisfactory payoff and g must be

o.o (g=O.O) for

defectors to receive an unsatisfactory payoff.
This class of inducement systems also fails to meet the
criterion that both learning models lead to cooperation
(c=n) as the equilibrium outcome. None of the four
inducement systems modeled (g<n) resulted in cooperation as
the equilibrium outcome for either the Fitness Model or the
satisfaction Model.
The use of competitive rewards should not be discarded
entirely. These types of rewards can be particularly
effective because of their high visibility within an
organization. Public awards based on outstanding performance
have symbolic as well as motivational impacts on the
organization. Competitive rewards can also be used in
conjunction with absolute rewards and/or penalties to form
hybrid inducement systems. In general, it may be preferable
to use competitive rewards on an unannounced basis to reward
past performance, rather than using them as the basis of
contests for future rewards. While this would lower the
motivational value of these rewards, it would increase their
symbolic value and avoid situations where competition
between individuals damages group performance.
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Despite the problems with competitive rewards noted by
others (Kohn, 1987), this type of incentives has gained some
acceptance in sales organizations (O'Dell, 1987; Colletti,
1988). These inducement systems take the form of special
cash incentives, noncash incentives and recognition
programs. The basis of the payment can be competing against
others or competing against the past performance level of
the individual. These incentives are often based on
subjective measures such as supervisory or peer rankings. In
general, only 5-10% of individuals receive rewards under
these programs (O'Dell, 1987). It should be noted that sales
organizations often have limited need for cooperation
between outside sales representatives.
One problem with competition based on management
discretion is that individuals may have a low expectation
that a given level of performance will result in the payment
of the rewards. This reduces the performance-outcome
expectancy and may limit the effectiveness of this type of
reward (O'Dell, 1987). Peer rankings generally have a higher
degree of accuracy and reliability (Latham & Wexley, 1981)
and should improve the [P-->0] expectancy. One such
inducement system would be a merit pool where payoffs are
based on peer rankings and where the size of the merit pool
is tied to group performance. This is a hybrid type of
system including elements of group and individual
incentives.
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The use of internal competition to improve productivity
has been quite controversial. Kohn (1987) has argued
strongly against all forms of internal competition and has
stressed the importance of cooperation and coordination in
improving performance. Based on the research reviewed by
Kohn (1987), he states that competition: 1) increases
anxiety, 2) decreases innovation, 3) restricts the flow of
information, and 4) limits the sharing of resources. Other
management authors (Kanter, 1987: and Peters, 1988) see
competition as potentially useful in certain situations,
particularly those involving competing work groups. Peters
cites the excellent results achieved by General Motors at
their New Unified Motor Manufacturing Inc. (NUMMI) auto
plant, based in part on competing work groups.
The results from this study indicate partial support
for Kohn's position. By themselves, competitive rewards did
not result in cooperation as the natural outcome for the
Individual, Collective or Altruism motives. Instead, the
only motives with cooperation as the natural outcome were
the Competitive and Aggression motives. When no group
incentives are used, this class of inducement systems is
ineffective in promoting cooperation. With the exception of
sales organizations, where cooperation between individuals
is not required, the use of competitive rewards is likely to
lead to dissatisfied workers and at best a partial level of
group cooperation. In fairness to Peters, this study did not
consider inducement systems based on group competition. The
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results do, in fact, point to the need for group incentives
when competitive rewards and penalties are used. Further
work is needed to determine the effectiveness of incentives
based on group competition.
Competitive Penalties. For inducement systems based on
competitive penalties, the region meeting the two
satisficing criteria has values of p and g such that g>l.O,
p>2.o, and p>g. This region is shown in Figure 76. Because
costs depend only upon the size of the group incentive
factor, the practitioner can choose differing levels of
penalties without incurring any added costs. This is
important in selecting an inducement system that has
cooperation as the natural outcome for the largest number of
social motives. Figure 64 (see Chapter IV) shows the summary
map of social motives for inducement systems using
competitive penalties. When p>2.0 all of the motives, except
the Aggression motive, have cooperation as the natural
outcome. However, when p<2.0 then only three motives have
cooperation as the natural outcome, 1) Individual,
2) Collective, and 3) Altruism.
Some caution should be given regarding the use of high
competitive penalty factors. First, managers are often
reluctant to administer penalties. The effectiveness of the
inducement system will be severely undercut if managers fail
to deliver these penalties. Second, errors in determining
cooperators from defectors might result in cooperators being
unfairly penalized. This could have undesirable consequences

227

J(SO.
y

10.0

Penal1y
Factor
p

5.0

-

1.0

-

0

I

0

1.0

I

5.0
Group Incentive Factor (g)

I

10.0

Region meeting effectiveness criteria.
Figure 76 . Map of the region meeting effectiveness criteria for
competitive penalties.

228

on future motivation. The need for well-trained managers and
accurate evaluation systems cannot be overemphasized when
penalties are used as part of the inducement system. In
general, the problems noted for inducement systems using
absolute penalties are also applicable to inducement systems
using competitive penalties.
Another point which should be made about these
inducement systems is that when g<n the equilibrium outcome
(cooperation or defection) depends on the initial level of
cooperation. When the level of cooperation is less than
1/n+(1-g/n)/p, defection is the natural outcome. This result
is consistent with the results for the two simulation models
used in phase III. Complete cooperation (cjn=1.0) was the
steady-state outcome only when the initial level of
cooperation was greater than 1/n+(1-g/n)fp. Note that when
the level of group cooperation is less than 1/n+(1-g/n)/p,
it may be inadvisable to introduce competitive penalties.
Competitive penalties are not generally included as a
formal part of inducement systems. Instead, they tend to be
part of the informal inducement system of the organization
and take the form of discipline, demotion and layoffs. A
novel program for improving attendance is based on providing
attendance coaching to the workers with the worst attendance
each month. Attendance records are posted each month and the
employees with the worst attendance sent to the manager's
office for a discussion of how the employee can improve his
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attendance. Failure to improve can result in discipline and
eventual termination.
Competitive penalties also operate in consulting
organizations and universities where low performers are
often forced to leave the organization. Advancement or
tenure are often based on competing against others in
similar positions. These informal penalty systems are
reflected in sayings like "up or out" and "publish or
perish".
Competitive Rewards and Penalties. The inducement
systems meeting the two satisficing criteria for the class
of inducement systems based on competitive rewards and
penalties have values of r, p and g such that (r+p)/2>g and
g>l.O (see Table XII). Because costs are independent of the
size of the reward and penalty factors when cjn=l.O, the
practitioner can set these values without being overly
concerned about costs.
Unfortunately, when (r+p)/2>g the Satisfaction model
has a steady-state level of cooperation of less than 1.0
(c/n<l.O). Additionally, when (r+p)/2>g the motives that
have cooperation as the natural outcome include the
Aggression motive. If the inducement system designer wishes
to avoid the Aggression motive, then he needs to set the
value of (r+p)/2 less than g. The Altruism motive then
becomes one of the motives with cooperation as the natural
outcome. However, when (r+p)/2<g the payoff to defectors is
positive. The compromise is to set (r+p)/2=g. Inducement
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systems meeting these criteria are shown in Figure 77. These
inducement systems then are indifferent to both the
Aggression and Altruism motives. In practice, the use of
competitive rewards and penalties requires that the
organization abandon either the criterion that defectors
receive an unsatisfactory outcome or the criterion that both
simulation models lead to total cooperation as the
steady-state outcome.
One interesting feature of this class of inducement
systems is that even when g<l.O the natural outcome is
cooperation, provided that (r+p)/2>(n-g)j(n-l). Reducing g
to less then 1.0 results in negative payoffs to cooperators,
but cooperation remains the natural outcome for this
Category II region. These are reverse prisoner's dilemma
games. While this region does not meet the criterion that
cooperators receive a satisfactory outcome, these inducement
systems have cooperation as the natural outcome for the
Individual, Competitive and Aggression motives and have
costs of less than 1.0 utiles. This region may be of
interest to organizations that can tolerate a high degree of
turnover or wish to promote the Competitive and Aggression
motives. Another potential use of these types of rewards and
penalties is to combine them with absolute rewards and
penalties. More work is needed to investigate these hybrid
classes of inducement systems.
In general, the problems which were noted for
competitive rewards or competitive penalties also hold for
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inducements systems based on competitive rewards and
penalties. The use of penalties is problematic in most
organizations. Penalties, particularly monetary penalties,
require a high level of supervisory training and skills. As
noted by Kohn (1987), competition has serious side-effects
which can cause performance problems in organizations.
organizational Implications. Based on the results for
the six classes of inducement systems, the use of absolute
rewards and/or penalties is recommended over the use of
competitive rewards and/or penalties. No inducement systems
were found which met all of the selection criteria for
inducement systems based on competitive rewards. For
inducement systems based on competitive rewards and
penalties, the organization must choose between a partial
level of cooperation and allowing defectors to receive a
satisfactory outcome. While inducement systems based on
competitive penalties met each of the selection criteria
when p>2.0, g>l.O and p>g, there are problems in
administering penalties and general concerns over the sideeffects of competition. While competitive rewards and
penalties can be effective in cases where high turnover is
acceptable and where there is little need for the
coordination of activities (e.g. outside sales
representatives), the general use of competitive rewards and
penalties is not recommended. More work is needed to look at
hybrid systems of absolute and competitive rewards and
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penalties and other form of competition, particularly group
competition.
Inducement systems based on absolute rewards andjor
penalties were found to be quite effective in gaining the
contributions of individuals. A broad range of inducement
systems were found that meet each of the selection criteria,
although some adjustment in base pay was required for
inducement systems based on absolute rewards. This class of
inducement systems allow the designer a great deal of
discretion in balancing individual and group incentives.
One attractive option would be to lower base pay by
g utiles and use gainsharing plus lump sum merit increases
as the basis of the group and individual incentives. Base
pay would need to be lowered by g utiles and the reward
opportunity set at greater than 1.0 utiles. In sales or
piece work organizations, where a high degree of
coordination is not required, the group incentive factor
could be dropped and lump sum merit increases replaced by a
sales commission or piece rate. If penalties are desired,
they could be noncash penalties, such as coaching and
discipline, rather than monetary penalties.
Motivation Theory
The work done in this study has applicability beyond
the analysis of organizational inducement systems. The
addition of game theoretic methods represents a potentially
powerful expansion of motivation theory. These methods make
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possible an analysis of the motivation of groups of
individuals rather than being restricted to dealing only
with single individuals. These methods also provide a
framework for integrating expectancy theory, equity theory
and other theories of motivation based on social motives.
The approaches of expectancy theory and game theory are
closely related. Both approaches assume that individuals
will make choices that maximize their self-interest. In
expectancy theory, the expected value or payoff from actions
are based on the conditional probabilities
(i.e. expectancies) that a chosen level of effort will
result in outcomes of differing preferences (i.e. valences).
Two sets of probabilities are involved: 1) the probability
that a level of effort will result in a specified level of
performance (E-->P), and 2) the probability that the level
of performance will result in certain outcomes (P-->0). The
general formulation of expectancy theory is that the
motivational force is equal to [E-->P][P-->O]V, where Vis
the valence of the outcomes to the individual (Vroom, 1964).
This study has assumed that the individual's choice to
contribute discretionary effort results in the outcomes
specified by the inducement system. This implies means that
the motivational force depends only upon the valence of the
outcomes and that [E-->P]=1.0 and [P-->0]=1.0. The
simplified approach used in this study can be modified to
incorporate the [E-->P] and [P-->0] probabilities of
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expectancy theory. The payoffs for cooperation and defection
become:
c(c)=[Ec-->Pc][Pc-->Oc]Vc
D(c)=[E 0-->Po][P 0 -->o 0 ]v0
The term [Ec-->Pc] is the expectancy or probability
that cooperation (an effort of 1.0 utiles) will result in
the level of contributions (i.e. performance) defined as
cooperation. Since there is no discretionary effort
associated with defection, [E 0 -->Po] is equal to 1.0. The
term [Pc-->Oc] is the expectancy that the level of
performance defined as cooperation will result in the
specified payoffs for cooperation. The term [P0-->0o] is the
expectancy that the level of performance defined as
defection will result in the specified payoffs for
defection. The terms Vc and v 0 are the valences or utilities
of the outcomes from cooperation (including the cost of the
effort to cooperate) and defection. These are the payoffs
shown in Table II for the six classes of inducement systems.
While this study considers only two levels of effort, a more
complete analysis would consider a number levels of effort
and contributions. With these additions, the game theoretic
approach used in this study is consistent with expectancy
theory.
As noted by Pfeffer (1982), expectancy theory takes the
individual as the unit of analysis. A criticism of
expectancy theory is that it ignores the organizational and
social environment. Defenders of expectancy theory might
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argue that these influences are reflected in the
expectancies and valences that individuals assign to actions
and outcomes. However, absent a theoretical basis for
predicting how the social and organizational environment
influences expectancies and valences, expectancy theory will
have limited applicability in real-world organizations. This
is an important and fundamental criticism of expectancy
theory.
The application of game theory to the study of
organizational inducements provides a framework for
expanding expectancy theory to incorporate elements of the
social and organizational environment. The approach outlined
in this study does this in two ways. First, it incorporates
the choices of others into the decision making model. By
including the effects of choices by others on the payoffs to
self, the individual is able to make choices that reflect
the interdependencies present in organizations. Game theory
provides a richer and more realistic framework for
understanding individual choice within organizations.
Second, game theory expands expectancy theory by
incorporating additional social motives that can arise in
organizations. Expectancy theory is unable to provide an
explanation for the socially motivated behaviors that occur
in organizations. The development of equity theory is an
attempt to incorporate social motives into motivation
theory. The application of game theory to the study of
organizational inducements provides a common framework for
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integrating a variety of social motives into the general
approach of expectancy theory. Identifying a framework for
integrating two of the important cognitive theories of
motivation is an important outcome from this study.
It should be noted that the use of payoff matrices and
curves does not change the assumption that motivation is a
within-person process. Individuals still make choices
between alternative actions based on their personal analysis
of the payoffs to self and others.
Future Research
The work done in this study breaks new ground in the
areas of inducement system design and motivation theory. The
results of this study also point out the need for further
empirical and theoretical research.
Empirical work is needed to 1) test the recommendations
on inducement system design, and 2) determine whether the
use of game theory and incorporation of social motives
increase the predictive ability of expectancy theory. Before
adopting the inducement systems recommended earlier, it
would be appropriate to determine whether existing data
support those recommendations. A broad survey of the
relative success of companies and the type of inducement
systems being used in those companies is needed.
The application of this study to the design of
inducement systems will also require that a common utility
scale for measuring both contributions and efforts be
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developed. Initially, it may be expedient to equate a
percentage increase in contributions with a percentage
increase in total compensation (e.g. a 10% increase in
contributions is just offset by a 10% increase in total
compensation). This approach will probably be satisfactory
when the contributions equate to added hours of work or a
higher piece rate. Problems are likely to be encountered
when the discretionary effort involves issues like quality,
customer interaction, or innovation. In the long run, more
information about the relative value of contributions to
various inducements is needed. Additionally, the work of
Deci (1971) makes it clear that further work is needed to
deal with the potential effect of extrinsic rewards (e.g.
pay) on the individual's level of intrinsic motivation.
While these problems are common to any theory of
organizational inducements, they limit the application of
the results from this study in designing organizational
inducement systems.
Another needed piece of empirical work is to determine
whether the incorporation of social motives increases the
predictive ability of expectancy theory. This work will
require that instruments be developed to measure the
relative weights of the various social motives within
individuals. The use of before and after tests might also
shed some light on the evolution of social motives. Like
past research on motivation, this research should begin with
laboratory testing to refine instruments and methods.
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Research could then be expanded to experiments outside of
the laboratory.
In addition to empirical research, further theoretical
research is needed. Several simplifying assumptions were
used in this study. In particular, only two level of
contributions were considered in the analysis. Expanding the
analysis to include additional levels of cooperation would
show whether the results are affected when individuals are
free to contribute at a variety of performance levels.
A second simplifying assumption used in phases I & II
was to treat each individual as having identical
preferences. A more realistic but less tractable assumption
would be to treat individuals as having differing
preferences. Such an analysis can become quite complicated
when more than two individuals are considered. It may be the
case, however, that individuals assign one set of
preferences to themselves while attributing another set to
others. If a single set of preferences could be attributed
to others, the analysis of the n-person case would be
manageable. The attribution of different motives to others
is consistent with attribution theory, and might be
significant in organizational settings.
Further analysis is also needed to look into other
forms of inducements. In particular, additional analysis is
needed to investigate hybrid inducement systems using both
competitive and absolute rewards andjor penalties.
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Inducement systems based on competition between group rather
than individuals should also be investigated.
Additional work is also needed to integrate the various
social motives into a single theory of motivation. The work
done in this study provides a common framework for analyzing
social motives. The results of phase II indicate the number
of social motives with cooperation as the natural outcome.
Further work is needed to integrate these motives into a
common scale representing the motivational force on the
individual.
One approach would be to treat the motives as separate
attributes of the possible outcomes. If the relative
importance of each of the motives to an individual was
known, then the relative motivational force of the various
outcomes could be developed using an approaches like
multiutility attribute theory or multiple criteria decision
making (Zelany, 1982). Both of these approaches would treat
the social motives as attributes of the decision to
cooperate or defect. In multiutility attribute theory, the
utility of each attribute (i.e. social motive) is treated
separately. The attributes are assumed to be independent, so
that the utility of any outcome is equal to the sum of the
utilities from the individual attributes. The utility
functions for cooperation and defection for each attribute
are given by the payoff functions for each social motive,
Ci(c) and Di(c) (see Table III). Following the approach of
expectancy theory, the motivational force for cooperation
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and defection would be represented by the combined utility
functions Sum(wici(c)) and Sum(wiDi(c)), where:
wi=relative weight of motive i.
In multiple criteria decision making, the best values
of each attribute (i.e. Pmax> are determined from the set of
possible outcomes. These best or ideal values are used to
construct the hypothetical displaced ideal or bliss point.
Each outcome is then evaluated based on its distance from
the displaced ideal. These distances are weighted for the
importance of the social motives to the individual. The
motivational force for an outcome could then be based on the
weighted distance of the available outcomes from the
displaced ideal. The closer the outcome, the greater its
motivational force. Additionally, it might be possible to
use this approach to include attributes associated with
intrinsic motivation. This could shed light on the problem
of the interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
(Deci, 1971).
The portion of this study that could most benefit by
additional theoretical research is the work done in Phase
III on the evolution of social motives. This exploratory
work only begins to scratch the surface of the work that
might be done in developing a dynamic model of motivation
and social motives. one extension would be to incorporate a
memory factor into the simulation models. This would allow
individuals to make predictions about the future based on a
more complete history of prior outcomes. This might
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eliminate some of the cycling behavior noted in the
simulation models. The inclusion of a memory factor would
also make the model consistent with the relative payoff sum
model developed by Harley (1981).
Another logical extension of the work done in phase II
would be to integrate the two learning models (Fitness and
Satisfaction) into a single model. This integration could be
accomplished by assigning weighting factors to each of the
social motives. The strength of the weighting factors for
the Individual motive would represent the importance of the
material payoffs (Fitness model) to the individual. The
weights of the other social motives would represent the
individual's genuine preferences for the other social
outcomes (Satisfaction model). These weights could then be
assumed to evolve based on how well the motives preferences
are satisfied. The measure of "satisfaction" could be
defined using an interval scale based on the maximum and
minimum values of the attribute for the set of possible
outcomes. Such an approach would allow individuals to adjust
the importance they assign to motives based on a need to
reduce the dissonance between actual and desired outcomes.
This approach would mesh nicely with methods and assumptions
used in multiple criteria decision making. It would also be
consistent with the individual's need to reduce their
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).
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Summary
The methods of game theory have been used in this study
to analyze organizational inducement systems and social
motives. Starting with the concept of the inducementscontributions contract, six classes of inducement systems
were formulated into mathematical terms. These inducement
systems cover a broad range of individual and group
incentives that organizations might use to gain the
cooperation of individuals with the goals of the
organization.
The classification scheme developed by Rappaport and
Guyer (1966) for 2-person games was modified for use in
determining the natural outcome for uniform n-person games.
Beginning with the Individual motive, based on maximizing
self-interest, the classification scheme was used to analyze
the six classes of inducement systems and determine the
values of the individual reward and penalty and group
incentive factors that would result in cooperation as the
natural outcome. An additional analysis of this motive was
done based on the satisficing theory of Simon (1976).
This game theoretic analysis was repeated for five
additional social motives, 1) Collective, 2) Competitive,
3) Altruism, 4) Equity, and 5) Aggression. The combined
results indicate the values of the individual reward,
penalty and group incentive factors needed to achieve
cooperation as the natural outcome for these social motives.
For the idealized inducement systems treated in this study,
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these results allow the determination of the inducement
systems parameters that will promote cooperation with the
organization over a range of social motives.
Two dynamic learning models were developed to determine
whether cooperation would be stable and to explore the
possible evolution of social motives within a given
inducement system. One model assumes that social motives are
strategies for maximizing material payoffs. The other model
treats social motives as genuine preferences for social
outcomes. These two simulation models were run until
equilibrium conditions were reached. Together with the
earlier results from the study, these simulations were used
to recommend inducement systems of potential interest to
organizational practitioners.
The work described above was used to develop a set of
selection criteria (see Table XI) for choosing inducement
systems which should be effective in promoting individual
cooperation with the goals of the organization. These
criteria were applied to the six classes of inducement
systems to determine the values of the reward, penalty and
group incentive factors required for an inducement system to
meet each of the effectiveness criteria. These results are
shown in Table XII, along with the least cost inducement
system. The practical implications of the results were
discussed for each class of inducement systems. In general,
inducement systems based on absolute rewards and/or
penalties were found to be more effective than were
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inducement systems based on competitive rewards and/or
penalties. Suggestions were given for applying the results
to the design of organizational inducement systems.
In addition to providing insights into the design of
organization inducement systems, this study makes
contributions to the theory of motivation. The application
of game theory allows the general approach of expectancy
theory to be expanded to include the outcomes and decisions
of others in the organization. This extends the unit of
analysis beyond the individual to include others in the
organization.
A second theoretical contribution of the study is the
incorporation of social motives into a framework consistent
with expectancy theory. The expansion of expectancy theory
to include social motives is a potentially powerful
expansion of the theory. The analytical framework provided
by this study should allow for a common scale of
motivational force to be developed which incorporates a
range of social motives. Multiple criteria decision making
(Zelany, 1982) is suggested as a method for building this
integrated theory of motivation.
A third theoretical contribution of the study is the
application of methods from evolutionary game theory to the
development of two learning models of motivation. These
models are dynamic models of motivation that allow the level
of cooperation and frequencies of social motives to evolve.
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These models should be viewed as a speculative effort
towards developing a dynamic model of motivation.
Lastly, this study illustrates how game theory can be
used to integrate ideas from organization theory, social
psychology and theoretical biology to explore questions
about social motives and the design of organizational
inducements. This illustrates the ability of general systems
theory to contribute to the knowledge base at the levels of
both theory and practice.
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APPENDIX A
PHASE I RESULTS

This appendix contains maps showing the natural outcome
and game category for six classes of inducement systems
based on the Individual motive. These are followed by maps
showing the results of the satisficing analysis for initial
cooperators and initial defectors.
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APPENDIX B
PHASE II RESULTS

This appendix contains maps showing the natural outcome
and game category for six classes of inducement systems
based of five social motives: 1) Collective, 2) Competitive,
3) Altruism, 4) Equity, and 5) Aggression •
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APPENDIX C
PHASE III RESULTS

This appendix contains graphs showing the evolution of
social motives for selected inducement systems based on the
results from two simulation models: 1) Fitness model, and
2) Satisfaction model.
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